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Abstract in English 
Innovation seldom has purely domestic causes and consequences, but how can a European 
innovation policy complement or substitute national policies? Taking the subsidiarity principle 
as a starting point, this report discusses the economic rationale of a European innovation policy. 
Explorative empirical analysis suggests that public R&D and public funding of private R&D are 
subject to economies of scale and external effects. This is an argument in favour of a European 
innovation policy but amongst other things, the heterogeneity in social economic objectives on 
public R&D spending between Member States pleas for national government involvement. In 
addition, there are scale economies in the protection of intellectual property and in the 
development of standards. We conclude that a European innovation policy could have, or 
already has, substantial benefits over purely national policy in these areas. With respect to 
innovation policies targeted at SMEs, we do not find economies of scale or external effects. It 
seems to be efficient that these policies are mainly conducted at the national level. 
Key words: innovation policy, subsidiarity, European Union  
JEL code: O38, H77, H87, F15 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Innovatie heeft zelden uitsluitend binnenlandse oorzaken en gevolgen, maar hoe kan een 
Europees innovatiebeleid nationaal innovatiebeleid aanvullen of vervangen? Dit rapport 
evalueert de economische argumenten voor een Europees innovatiebeleid en neemt daarbij het 
subsidiariteitprincipe als uitgangspunt. Verkennend empirisch onderzoek geeft aan dat publieke 
onderzoek en ontwikkeling (O&O) en publiek gefinancierde private O&O onderhevig zijn aan 
schaalvoordelen en externe effecten. Dit kan een reden zijn voor een Europees innovatiebeleid, 
maar ondermeer de verscheidenheid in sociaal-economische doelstellingen van publieke 
onderzoeksuitgaven tussen de lidstaten pleit voor een grote betrokkenheid van de nationale 
lidstaten. Daarnaast komen schaalvoordelen voor bij de bescherming van intellectueel 
eigendom en bij de ontwikkeling van standaarden. We concluderen dat op deze gebieden een 
Europees innovatiebeleid substantiële voordelen kan hebben, of al heeft, ten opzichte van het 
voeren van uitsluitend nationaal beleid. Voor innovatiebeleid gericht op het midden- en 
kleinbedrijf vinden we geen schaalvoordelen of externe effecten. Het lijkt efficiënt dat dit beleid 
vooral op nationaal niveau wordt uitgevoerd. 
Steekwoorden: innovatiebeleid, subsidiariteit, Europa,  
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl. 
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Preface 
Innovation policy is on the rise in Europe. Most European countries try to stimulate innovation 
as a means to increase productivity (growth). In 2000 the Member States of the European Union 
agreed to increase R&D spending towards 3% of GDP. Now and then initiatives are launched to 
increase expenditures on innovation and research in the EU budget. This raises the question 
whether innovation policies should be conducted at the level of national governments or at the 
European level. This document addresses this question from the subsidiarity principle. It is the 
second part of a CPB study on knowledge in Europe. This study is commissioned by the Dutch 
Ministry of Economic affairs. The first part of the study on higher education has been 
conducted by Laura Thissen and Sjef Ederveen and has been published as CPB Discussion 
Paper 68 in July 2006. 
 
Albert van der Horst, Arjan Lejour, and Bas Straathof digged into the question of the 
appropriate government level for innovation policy. They benefited from constructive 
comments by their CPB colleagues Maarten Cornet, George Gelauff and Björn Vroomen, as 
well as by their former colleague Sjef Ederveen. They also want to thank the sounding board for 
their contribution in guiding this project, in particular Sander Baljé, Odilia Knap, Stephan Raes 
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Summary 
Nowadays, Europe focuses on innovation as a solution to its poor productivity growth. 
Europe’s growth figures look pale in comparison with those of the US and many Asian 
countries, most notably China and India. Although growth in the latter countries is due to 
catching up, many people are worried about Europe’s role in the world economy. Productivity 
increases would blush Europe’s economy. The EU Member States agreed to increase R&D 
spending and many policy initiatives emerge to stimulate innovation at the European, national 
and regional level. At this moment, national governments spend about 65 billion euros on 
public research per year and the European Commission about 8 billion euros (the yearly budget 
of the Seventh Framework Programme and the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework 
Programme). Given the total amount of 73 billion euros, should the division between national 
and European spending be altered? This document discusses the appropriate decision level of 
innovation policy. Is there a role for European coordination and a European budget or do 
national governments have the primacy for innovation policy (as it seems now)? Is a 
Community Patent desirable and what is the role for Europe in stimulating innovation by Small- 
and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs)? These questions are analysed from the perspective of 
the subsidiarity principle. Are there economies of scale or external effects that can be 
internalised through coordination of national innovation policies in Europe? Or is the 
heterogeneity in policy objectives, structure of the economy or preferences in Europe too large 
to conduct innovation policies efficiently from Brussels? 
 
Innovation policy covers many areas including public research and development (R&D), public 
funding of private R&D, Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), entrepreneurship and 
venture capital, and policies dealing with intellectual property rights (IPRs) and standards. For 
each of these areas, we assess the appropriate policy level: coordination at the EU-level or 
decision power by national governments. Economies of scale and external effects would 
support coordination of innovation policy at the EU level, whereas national policies are to be 
preferred in cases with strong heterogeneity in objectives, preferences or economic structure. In 
analysing economies of scale and external effects we use amongst others data on R&D 
spending. These data are input indicators and not output indicators on innovation. In comparing 
Member States, we implicitly assume that the efficiency of national innovation policies does not 
vary.  
Public funding of R&D 
We have compared the relative size of public R&D expenditure to the size of the economy for 
about 25 countries. Public R&D consists of government R&D, e.g. R&D by public enterprises, 
and research funds for universities and other institutes for higher education. It ranges from 0.2% 
in small countries, like Luxembourg, to 1% in Finland and Sweden. Both scale economies and  
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external effects are present in public R&D. Larger economies such as Japan, United States and 
Germany spend relatively more on public R&D than smaller economies and (smaller) countries 
which are more open to trade spend relatively less on public R&D. This favours coordination of 
public research and development at the European level. For research projects characterised by 
large indivisibilities, European coordination is certainly desirable. However, the arguments for 
European coordination have to be weighted against the heterogeneity in policy objectives. The 
data show a large variety in socio-economic objectives in innovation. We interpret this as an 
indication for heterogeneity between Member States. National policies are probably better 
suited to cope with this heterogeneity which lend support to the current role of national 
governments in public R&D. Overall, we conclude that there are some reasons for coordinating 
public R&D by the European Commission, in particular for large projects characterised by 
indivisibility, and that other objectives could be better served by national authorities. 
 
Governments are not only active in public R&D but also in supporting private R&D with public 
funds. The size of these funds is on average much smaller than for public R&D. There is some 
evidence of scale economies and external effects in the public funding of private R&D. The 
data show that larger economies provide relatively more support for private R&D. These 
economies of scale could be due to fixed costs in providing public support for private R&D, 
such as monitoring or establishing an office or government agency for that purpose. Cross 
border externalities are significant in private R&D, which implies that part of the benefits of 
public funding of private R&D likely leaks abroad. However, the likely implication that 
governments of open economies spend less on public funding is not supported by the available 
data. 
We do not have specific data on the objectives of Member States regarding the public 
finance of private R&D, but the data on the objectives of publicly funded R&D as well as the 
literature suggest that the heterogeneity is large. Weighting these arguments, we arrive at a 
similar conclusion as for public R&D. The presence of scale economies and external effects 
support EU involvement in areas where national policy objectives match. Otherwise, national 
governments can better take account of the particular characteristics of the country regarding 
the sector structure, the innovation system, and preferences. 
 
Europe’s role in funding public R&D and private R&D is gaining momentum. Currently, the 
main instrument of the European Commission for funding R&D is the Seventh framework 
Programme (FP7). For the period 2007-2013, the budget is 53 billion euros. Under FP7, 
subsidies are granted for public and private research in Europe in order to “pool and leverage 
resources, foster human capital and excellence, and to better integrate R&D policies”. Most of 
these arguments refer to possible economies of scale in public research and the public funding 
of private research. Because the evidence suggests the presence of economies of scale and  
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external effects, most of the programmes within FP7 cannot be rejected from the subsidiarity 
perspective. 
Small- and Medium-sized Enterprises 
Governments often formulate innovation policies targeted at SMEs. Compared to large 
companies SMEs often have less access to capital markets, and less access to new technologies 
and new ideas. Government support could overcome this lack of access. The lack of access does 
not apply to all SMEs in the same degree, but depends on the characteristics of the enterprise. 
According to the definition of the EU, the size of SMEs ranges from self-employed to large 
exporting firms with up to 250 employees. Many SMEs often operate at the regional or national 
level. Their channels for knowledge and innovation are often regional or even local. Others 
operate at an international level, but this is a minority of the SMEs. This suggests that there will 
be no important economies of scale in innovation policies for SMEs in general. Scarce data 
material also confirms this view: there is no significant relation between the proportion of 
SMEs that receives public funding for innovation and the size of the economy. Neither does the 
proportion of SMEs reporting public funding depend negatively on their activities abroad, such 
that SME policy is unlikely to suffer from external effects. From the subsidiarity perspective 
there are no compelling reasons for conducting SME policies at the European level. The 
national level seems to be the most appropriate level for these policies because since there are 
no firm indications for economies of scale or the existence of external effects.  
The Competitiveness and Innovation framework Programme (CIP) of the European 
Commission, with a relatively small budget of 4 billion euros in 2007-2013, is targeted to 
SMEs. Part of the program intends to ease the supply of seed and early stage capital for 
innovative start-ups. European involvement in innovation policy for SMEs is justified from the 
subsidiarity perspective insofar CIP meets the goals of reducing regulations for innovative 
SMEs and of promoting policy learning between Member States. A small part of the 
programme deals with sustainable development and energy in Europe. The externalities in this 
specific area justify Europe’s involvement.  
Patents and standards 
Patents are important for fostering innovation because they provide an incentive for innovation 
and because they promote the diffusion of knowledge. The economies of scale for a single 
patent system in the European Union seem obvious. Currently, patents can be applied for at the 
European Patent Office (EPO), but once a patent is accepted by EPO, it is granted by individual 
countries under national legislation, which includes translation requirements. Litigation is also a 
national affair. A single patent for the EU – a Community Patent – within the jurisdiction of a 
European Patent Court could dramatically reduce the costs of acquiring a patent valid in all 
countries of the EU. However, attempts to establish a Community Patent have failed so far – 
officially on language related issues, but more likely out of protectionism and the vested interest  
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of the patent industry. From the perspective of subsidiarity the gains from a Community Patent 
are likely large.  
 
There is a tradition of European coordination of standards. Coordination reaps the benefits of 
economies of scale. It is cheaper setting standards Europe-wide than by each country 
individually. Moreover, European standards have the advantage that these are uniform over 
Europe, which benefits producers and consumers. Generally, standards are being developed by 
standard setting organisations (SSOs), which are semi-private institutions. These organisations 
generally are capable of preventing market failure in the form of lock-in into ex-ante inferior 
standards and a lack of standards. SSOs operate independently of the European Commission 
and national governments, except in areas related to safety, health and environment. In these 
areas, the EC commissions the development of standards to one of the three European SSOs. As 
such, standardisation related to EC regulation is, and should be, centralised at the European 
level.  
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1  Introduction 
Innovation policy is on the rise in Europe. The European Commission has doubled its budget 
for innovation policy for the coming years (2007-2013). The Directorate-General (DG) 
Enterprise and Industry has launched the Competitiveness and Innovation framework 
Programme (CIP) with a total budget of € 3.6 billion for the period 2007-2013. In addition, DG 
Research is working on the Seventh Research Framework Programme (FP7), with a proposed 
budget of € 53.2 billion for the same period. Still, the budget is only a small share, about a 
tenth, of the public expenditures on R&D by the Member States, which has fluctuated about 
0.65 per cent GDP since the early 1980’s.
1 
In March 2000 the Lisbon European Council defined the goal for the EU to become the 
‘most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010’. The 
European Union has concluded that investment in European research and development (R&D) 
must be increased to 3 per cent of GDP in 2010. This target is ambitious given the current R&D 
share of about 2 per cent. Only Finland and Sweden have R&D shares exceeding the three per 
cent target. 
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1 Data for EU15. Source: OECD (2005), Main Science and Technology Indicators 2005-2.  
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The ‘Lisbon agenda’ explicitly acknowledges the role of the business sector in research and 
development: at least two thirds of the total R&D expenditures (equal to 2 per cent GDP) 
should come from the private sector. Again, the ambition by far exceeds the current 
expenditures, which varies between 0.2 per cent of GDP in countries like Poland and Greece 
and 3.0 per cent in Sweden, see Figure 1.1. Moreover, private R&D expenditures did not show 
a clear upward trend in the recent decades – it fluctuated between 1.1 and 1.25% of European 
GDP. 
This raises the question how the private sector in the Member States can be triggered to 
intensify their investments in R&D, or more generally, to become more innovative. One part of 
this question, which has been extensively investigated by Cornet et al. (2006a), is which 
policies are likely to be successful in stimulating private R&D or raising productivity. They 
showed for the Dutch economy that, among other policies, expansion of the provisions for 
starting innovating companies and expansion of public support for funds that supply small 
amounts of venture capital loans are likely to be successful.
2  
The second part of the question how innovation can be stimulated is whether or not 
innovation policy should be coordinated at the European level, or should be left to the Member 
States. This is the central question in this paper. The prime reasons for coordinating innovation 
policy is to benefit from economies of scale caused by fixed cost and to overcome the negative 
effects of cross-border externalities, such as knowledge spillovers (Ederveen et al. (2006)). 
Cross-border externalities reduce the incentive for policy and thus lead to so-called policy 
externalities. European coordination can lead to a more efficient innovation policy as it can 
internalise these policy externalities. The key disadvantage of coordination is, however, that a 
European policy is less able to deal with location specific factors. The current document is an 
attempt to weigh the pros and cons of European coordination in innovation policy. In other 
words: is European innovation policy consistent with the subsidiarity principle, which states 
that a policy should only be adopted by the EC when Member States themselves cannot achieve 
equivalent or superior results? 
Little research has been done on desirability of European coordination of innovation policy 
so far. Hence, we perform an explorative empirical analysis of the economies of scale, cross-
border externalities and heterogeneity in each policy instrument. Given the limited availability 
of empirical evidence, our conclusions will be quite tentatively. In analysing economies of scale 
of external effects we use amongst others data on R&D spending. These data are input 
indicators and not output indicators on innovation. In comparing Member States on economies 
of scale we implicitly assume that the efficiency of national innovation policies does not vary. 
Relative large R&D spending on large countries we interpret as a signal for economies of scale, 
but in theory these countries could need more inputs to cope with inefficiencies in innovation.  
 
2 Other potentially successful policies are easier access to the Netherlands for well educated foreigners and making 
government funding of university research more conditional on research performance.  
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Innovation is a very broad concept. The European Commission (2005a) stresses the business 
component by defining innovation as a business process connected with exploiting market 
opportunities for new products, services and business processes. The Dutch government stresses 
the human factor by characterising innovation as improving the development and use of the 
possibilities of people.
3 As innovation is very broadly defined, this is also the case for 
innovation policy. We have to limit ourselves in the range of policies we deal with. First, we 
only deal with policies directly supporting innovation and leave aside policies which support 
innovation indirectly. Examples of the latter are trade liberalisation (see Eaton et al. (1998)), 
competition policy (see Encaoua and Hollander (2002) and Griffith et al. (2006)) and policies 
improving mobility of institutions, people and resources (see Aho et al. (2006)).
4 Secondly, 
education plays a key role in improving the innovative capacity of an economy. The role of the 
European Union in higher education has been investigated by Thissen and Ederveen (2006) in a 
companying paper. They find little support for European coordination of higher education. 
We selected four types of innovation policies which, according to our observation, are 
prominent in the European Union. First, we investigate the most direct type of innovation policy 
namely public investment in research and development (R&D). Next, we turn to the public 
financing of private R&D. Thirdly, the focus is shifted from the financing of innovation towards 
the conditions in which firms are able to develop and sell their innovations and innovative 
products. In particular, we pay attention to the small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) for 
which innovation depends crucially on entrepreneurship and the acquirement of venture capital. 
In addition, we discuss intellectual property rights and standards. Among the types of 
innovation policies (see OECD (2006)) which are left out are eduation policies (already dealt 
with in Thissen and Ederveen (2006)) and industry-science linkages (upon we briefly comment 
in Chapter 4).  
 
The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the market imperfections in innovation. 
Chapter 3 outlines how the principles of subsidiarity as formulated by Ederveen et al. (2006) 
apply to innovation policy. These principles are used in the succeeding chapters to evaluate the 
selected types of innovation policies. Chapter 4 focuses on public investment in R&D, Chapter 
5 on public funding of private R&D, Chapter 6 on SMEs and venture capital and Chapter 7 on 
intellectual property rights and standards. In Chapter 8 we apply the insights of the previous 
chapters to the EU programs on innovation, namely the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) 
and the Competitiveness and Innovation framework Programme (CIP). In each section we draw 
conclusions on the benefits of European coordination of innovation policy. These conclusions 
are reiterated in the Summary. 
 
3 www.innovatieplatform.nl 
4 See also Sociaal-Economische Raad (2004).  
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2  Market failures in the European economy 
Innovation policy generally aims at overcoming market failures that hamper innovation.
5 In 
countries with an isolated, autarkic economy such market failures can be dealt with by domestic 
policy alone. Autarky, however, is a thing of the distant past for the countries of the European 
Union. A process of economic integration has been progressing for centuries in Europe. 
Economic integration not only has brought wealth, but also has made the economic policies of 
Member States increasingly interdependent. In this section, we first introduce various types of 
market failure that provide the theoretical basis for innovation policy. After this overview, we 
summarise the empirical evidence on the impact of economic integration on research 
undertaken in the private sector.  
2.1  Market imperfections 
Innovation policy comes in a variety of forms. This variety is a reflection of the wide range of 
market failures it wishes to address. The most important types of market failure hampering 
innovation are due to: 
 
1.  Knowledge diffusion 
2.  Buyer surpluses 
3.  Duplication of research 
4.  Inefficient standardisation 
5.  Asymmetric information 
6.  Economies of scale 
 
2.1.1  Knowledge diffusion 
Diffusion of knowledge beyond a firm’s border is not completely avoidable. Leakage of 
knowledge can occur because a production method can be inferred from the products sold by 
the firm or because employees switch jobs. As an externality knowledge diffusion can take 
three forms, each with a different effect on the innovator: 
 
•  Imitation in markets not served by the innovator, 
•  (Threat of) imitation by competitors,  
•  Applications of innovations unintended by the innovator. 
 
The first kind of diffusion externality can arise when an inventor is unaware of the commercial 
possibilities of the invention, or when the inventor does not have access to all potential markets 
 
5 Market failure can also lead to too much innovation. Jones and Williams (2000), however, argue that this unlikely to occur.  
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because of protectionism by governments, cartels or other barriers. If the original inventor is 
unable to access a market this does not automatically imply that the invention will never reach 
this market as other (local) firms might be able to sell imitations. Although imitation raises 
welfare when the original inventor cannot access a market, this is still not an optimal outcome 
because the incentive for innovation does not reflect potential demand. 
Market-access can be promoted through indirect innovation policies such as trade-
liberalisation and competition policy (which are outside the scope of this report). Alternatively, 
the cost of trade-barriers can be reduced by means of subsidies on the export or import of 
innovative products, but this is clearly a second-best policy. 
 
A second form of externality induced by knowledge diffusion is caused by the often limited 
capability of firms to protect their intellectual property. When an innovation is imitated by 
competitors the revenues of the innovating firm diminish substantially.
6 For this reason, the 
threat of imitation alone can be enough to discourage innovation. Imitation can be reduced by 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) through copyright laws and patent systems. 
Branstetter et al. (2006) report that U.S. multinational firms have increased R&D expenditure 
by affiliates in countries that have adopted stronger IPR protection.  
 
The third diffusion externality is that an innovation can sometimes be applied in ways other 
than those originally envisioned by the innovator: one innovation provides the inspiration for 
another innovation. In the literature, this kind of externality is usually referred to as “knowledge 
spillovers” or the “standing on the shoulders of giants”-effect (after Newton). The invention of 
the transistor is a good example of this phenomenon. The developers of early transistors in the 
first half of the 20
th century could not have imagined the role played by computers today. In 
particular, many innovations and scientific breakthroughs would have been impossible without 
transistors. Open source software provides a more recent example of the importance of this 
externality (Lerner and Tirole (2005) and Maurer and Scotchmer (2006)). 
Because of the standing-on-shoulders effect the (potential) social value of an innovation is 
not limited to the sum of the deadweight loss and consumer and producer surpluses, but also 
includes a share of the value of subsequent innovations. Innovation policy aiming to internalise 
this externality faces the difficult task to facilitate the diffusion of knowledge without removing 
the incentive to innovate. This trade-off is especially relevant for the design of patent systems, 
which have the dual task of protecting IPRs and promoting diffusion of knowledge. A shorter 
duration of patents, for example, reduces the incentives to invent, but encourages the diffusion 
of knowledge, which provides opportunities for other inventions. In addition, subsidies can be 
given to research that promises to deliver innovations with great social value. 
 
6 If a competitor introduces a new product that has a higher quality (or lower production cost) than the original product, the 
original producer can even loose all of its revenues. In the economic literature this is known as ‘business-stealing’. Aghion 
and Howitt (1992)  have shown that business stealing can lead to overinvestment in R&D.  
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2.1.2  Buyer surpluses 
Not all the benefits of an innovation accrue to the innovator: the customers of the innovator 
receive more than what they pay for. As firms usually cannot discriminate perfectly between 
buyers, they have to set a single price for all customers, or, at best, they can set a single price 
for various types of customers. As a consequence some customers pay less than what they are 
willing to – which leads to a ‘consumer surplus’ or ‘rent-spillover’. Moreover, some potential 
customers do not buy the product even though they are willing to pay more than marginal cost, 
which results in a ‘deadweight loss’. The inability to discriminate perfectly between customers 
makes that innovators are rewarded only a part of the (potential) social value generated by an 
innovation and therefore they will innovate less than they should from a social planner’s 
perspective. Econometric studies have shown that the surplus generated by new products can be 
substantial. In a remarkable study, Hausman (1997) finds that the introduction of a new kind of 
cereal, Apple-Cinnamon Cheerio’s, has led to gain in consumer surplus of $66.8 million per 
year.
7  
Example of a buyer surplus: developing a new drug 
Consider the development of a new drug by a pharmaceutical company. If the company is not capable of discriminating 
between customers, then the company has to set a single price for all customers. Some customers will be able to pay 
this price, while the price will be too high for others. If the company would be able to sell the drug against personalised 
prices, every patient willing to pay at least the marginal cost will buy the drug. Not only would this raise the number of 
customers that are treated, but this would also increase the revenue from customers willing to pay at least the non-
differentiated monopoly price. 
 
Suppose the expected non-differentiated monopoly profits from producing a new drug are not sufficient to cover the cost 
of development and testing, then a government might induce the firm to develop the new drug anyway by giving a 
subsidy on R&D. Such a policy can improve welfare even though the drug will only be available for customers willing to 
pay the monopoly price. Alternatively, a government might subsidise the sales of the drug itself, which will allow more 
customers to use the drug and simultaneously increase the incentive for developing the drug. 
 
Typically, a drug is sold in many countries in the world. This raises the question of which country will subsidise the drugs 
for which the incentives for development and testing are insufficient. If the required subsidy is relatively small then a 
country with a high GDP might find it worthwhile to finance the subsidy – even when this gives other countries a free 
ride. When a larger subsidy is required, no single country might be willing to pay for the subsidy alone. In this situation 
cooperation between countries is necessary for the drug to be made available to customers. 
 
 
7 Inspired by the works of Hicks (1940), Hausman (1981, 1997) has developed a methodology for estimating the welfare 
gains that arise from the introduction of a new good. Later contributions in this direction include the work by Petrin (2002), 
Goolsbee and Petrin (2001), and Nevo (2003). Authors that have studied the surplus of new goods using alternative 
approaches are Trajtenberg (1989), Brynjolfsson (1997), and Berry et al. (2004).  
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2.1.3  Duplication of research 
Firms developing a new product usually are not aware of each other’s activities. As a 
consequence, two or more firms might end up doing the same research, which is a waste of 
resources. In principle, this problem can be avoided if firms make public what kind of product 
they are developing. There are two reasons why they might not do so. First, by making public 
their research agenda they might reveal information that benefits competitors. Second, firms 
might not be inclined to adapt their research agenda even if they know another firm is doing the 
same research because there is a possibility that they can get a patent before the other firms 
(Reinganum (1982), Dasgupta (1988)).  
In the first situation, a patent system can help to prevent the duplication of research as it 
allows firms to make their knowledge public without loosing the rents associated with 
invention. In the second case, strong protection of patents can actually increase duplication if 
the value of the exclusive right on an invention substantially exceeds the (expected) cost of 
developing the product. 
2.1.4  Inefficient standardisation 
Standardisation allows one type of product to be interoperable with other types of products. 
Users can benefit from interoperable products because of added functionality and lower cost, 
which raise demand and thereby attract new producers. For some products (e.g. cell-phones and 
computers) the value of the product also increases with the number of users. Without 
standardisation isolated groups of users and producers will coexist, such that the potential user-
value of the product is not fully realised. 
Failure to achieve efficient standardisation is a fourth type of market failure that offers a 
rationale for innovation policy. Markets may fail to provide efficient standards in three ways: 
 
•  Lock-in into inferior standards, 
•  Lack of standardisation or 
•  Excessive standardisation. 
 
A classic example of lock-in is that of the QWERTY keyboard (David (1985)). Lock-in can 
happen when no single firm has an incentive to change the standard as the adjustment cost of its 
users is high. Farrell and Saloner (1985), (1986) and Katz and Shapiro (1985), (1986) show that 
lock-in into inferior standards can also arise in the context of oligopolistic competition. A lack 
of standardisation can occur when new technologies are cheap to introduce and consumers do 
not take into account network effects (Katz and Shapiro (1986)). Standardisation can be 
excessive if it leads to a loss in product variety. Katz and Shapiro (1985), (1986) demonstrate 
that this can occur when firms are sponsoring (“subsidising”) their technologies. 
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If market failure prevents the efficient adoption of standards, a standard can be enforced by the 
government. However, experiences in telecommunications and information technology 
demonstrate that voluntary agreements can be very successful in setting standards. Two 
flavours of voluntary agreements have been studied in the literature. First, Lerner and Tirole 
(2005) and Maurer and Scotchmer (2006) review the literature on ‘open source’ arrangements 
that are popular in software development. Second, Farrell and Saloner (1988), Lerner and Tirole 
(2004) and Farhi et al. (2005) provide theoretical analyses of standard setting organisations 
(SSOs). Examples of influential SSOs are the International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO), International Telecommunications Union (ITU), the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 
The empirical work on SSOs predominantly consists of case-studies.
8 A more systematic 
analysis can be found in Chiao et al. (2006). One of their findings is that mandatory royalty-free 
licensing is inversely related with disclosure requirements by SSOs. This indicates a trade-off 
between the openness of a standard and its quality, which depends on the willingness of 
participants to share their knowledge. 
 
Governments generally have three instruments capable of promoting efficient standardisation. 
They can facilitate efficient standardisation by setting standards directly, by referring to 
voluntary standards developed by standards setting organisations (SSOs) and by ensuring fair 
competition between companies, such that the influence of dominant firms on the choice of a 
standard is kept in control. The latter strategy falls outside the scope of this report, but will be 
touched upon in Section 7.3. The first strategy is rarely adopted, instead governments generally 
leave the development of standards to SSOs. Reference to SSO standards in laws and regulation 
is common, but usually is confined to areas related to safety, health and environment. 
SSOs are capable of reducing the first two forms of market failure. First, SSOs can reduce 
the chance of lock-in into an inferior standard as some form of consensus is usually sought on 
what the best standard would be before it is being set. These voluntary agreements have the 
important advantage over government intervention that the former provide an incentive for 
sharing knowledge, leading to superior standards. Second, SSOs provide a platform for 
interested parties to develop standards and they facilitate the dissemination of standards that 
have been agreed upon. In this way, SSOs can reduce market failure leading to a lack of 
standards. 
2.1.5  Asymmetric information 
The researchers working on a project know more about the chances of success than others. This 
asymmetry in information hinders the financing of R&D-projects. Hall (2002) discusses two 
reasons why R&D can be more costly to finance than other types of investment: 
 
8 For examples of case studies, see the references provided in Chiao et al. (2006, p. 6).  
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•  Adverse selection between inventor and investor and 
•  Moral hazard from the inventor’s side. 
 
A potential investor in an R&D project has less information about the project than the 
researchers that are proposing the project. This introduces a problem of asymmetric information 
similar to the lemons problem of Akerlof (1970), which results in a ‘funding gap’ between the 
private provision of capital and what would be the socially optimal level (Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and Leland and Pyle (1977)). Revealing information about the project to potential 
investors does not solve this problem as this will lower the value of the project (Bhattacharya 
and Ritter (1983)). Evidence on a lemons problem for the financing of R&D has been presented 
by Alam and Walton (1995), Szewczyk et al. (1996) and Zantout (1997). 
Lack of funding due to asymmetric information can be mitigated through interference by 
venture capitalists, who are specialised in monitoring start-up companies. Hall (2002), however, 
reports that venture capital is not sufficient to close the funding gap. Whether governments can 
close the gap through government incubators, seed funding or loan guarantees remains to be 
seen, as also the government is confronted with asymmetric information. 
Moral hazard is another problem that hinders the financing of innovation. When the goals of 
investors and inventors are not identical, the former need to monitor the latter. However, 
Boocock and Woods (1997) show that the cost of monitoring reduces investors willingness to 
finance R&D-projects. Another instance of moral is studied by Hall (2002), who discusses the 
literature on conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers. Managers can be more 
risk averse than shareholders if the managers’ outside options are less attractive than their 
current position. Risk aversion harms the interest of shareholders as it reduces investment in 
risky R&D-projects. 
2.1.6  Economies of scale 
Economies of scale can lead to market failure if they enable a company to capture such a 
market share that it leads to market power. The resulting reduction in competition not only 
increases the dead-weight loss on the product market, but also reduces some incentives for 
innovation. A monopolist is unlikely to develop product improvements as this would destroy 
the profits stemming from existing products.
9 When it comes to innovation, two classes of scale 
economies can be distinguished: 
•  Fixed cost 
•  Internalisation of externalities 
 
 
9 Aghion and Howitt (1992) labelled this phenomenon “creative destruction”.  
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Expenditure on research almost always takes the form of fixed cost as research generally yields 
usable output only at the end of the R&D process. This convexity in the productivity of research 
implies that more complex innovations require higher upfront expenditure than less complicated 
innovations. For example, the development of a new drug tends to cost more than a new piece 
of software. Once developed, a new product can be sold in arbitrary numbers without raising 
development cost, which introduces an element of scale economies. 
A second reason for economies of scale in research is that large companies internally can 
avoid or reduce market failure. To begin with, knowledge spillovers within the firm can be 
taken into account when funding research. A project with large spillovers to other projects 
within the firm can be worthwhile to fund even when such a project would be loss-making in 
the market. Another advantage of a large firm is that knowledge can diffuse relatively freely 
within the company without the risk of imitation. Better diffusion of knowledge also may 
improve the functioning of a firm’s internal capital market. First, because duplication of 
research can be avoided. If the management of a company knows what the activities of each 
department are, it will be relatively straightforward to prevent duplication. Second, intra-firm 
knowledge diffusion helps to reduce asymmetry in information. Both adverse selection and 
moral hazard still may occur, but are likely to be less severe as employees generally have at 
least some incentives (e.g. a salary with profit-sharing) that are aligned with the company’s 
interest. For these reasons more information is available on internal capital markets than on 
external capital markets. Hence, the risk premium on internal capital is below that of external 
capital. 
 
Increasing returns to scale in research tend to reduce competition, but at the same time lead to 
lower cost of research. The former discourages innovation, while the latter facilitates it. 
Governments may counter anti-competitive behaviour by restricting the size of firms or even by 
splitting them up, but such a policy comes at the cost of a loss in the efficiency of research. 
Alternatively, governments can assign an independent (competition) authority with the task of 
monitoring and regulating industries in which competition is lacking. In the extreme case of a 
natural monopoly, governments may even decide to nationalise the monopolist. 
2.2  Economic integration 
The market imperfections described above can be an economic reason for the government to 
intervene. The importance of the various imperfections depends on country-specific conditions 
including the size of the market. Market size is affected by economic integration globally and 
more specifically in Europe. Before analysing the appropriate level of government intervention 
for innovation policies in Europe we sketch the consequences of market integration for 
innovation by firms. Economic integration affects research in the private sector through two 
channels:  
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•  Firms can better exploit economies of scale, both in production and research 
•  Cross-border knowledge diffusion creates a larger knowledge base 
 
This section evaluates a selection of the empirical evidence on the strength of both channels. 
2.2.1  Scale economies for firms 
Economic integration brings economies of scale for the private sector. These economies of scale 
occur both in production and in research. Considering the former, trade liberalisation makes it 
possible that a good can be produced in a single country and exported to other countries. In this 
way a firm can spread fixed production cost over a larger amount of goods, and, in addition, the 
firm can choose a country in which the conditions for production are most favourable. The 
resulting lower cost of production is likely to raise profitability. Higher profitability in turn 
provides an incentive to invent new products and improve existing ones. 
A similar argument can be made for scale economies in research itself. When a company is 
developing a product that can be sold everywhere in Europe, the profits of this company will be 
larger than if the same product could only be sold in a single country. Through its impact on 
scale economies in production and research, economic integration can greatly stimulate 
innovation. 
Figure 2.1 displays the share of private R&D expenditure in GDP plotted against the size of 
the economy in terms of its gross domestic product (GDP). The figure suggests that the relative 
size of a country’s private R&D is positively associated with its GDP. Two conclusions can be 
drawn from this graph. First, there is some evidence that the scale of the domestic market 
indeed matters for innovation. Second, other factors appear to be dominating the effect of the 
domestic market. The Nordic countries spend more on R&D than what is to be expected from 
their size, whereas Eastern-European countries spend less. A possible explanation for this 
pattern is that the Nordic countries perform research for the world market, while Eastern Europe 
lags behind for historical reasons. 
The share of private R&D in GDP in the EU lies substantially below the regression line 
plotted in Figure 2.1. This suggests that less research is performed in the European Union than 
could have been expected from the EU’s GDP. The outcome suggests that further economic 
integration in the European Union could induce an increase in private R&D of almost a half 




10 The positive association  between the share of R&D in GDP and GDP itself is unlikely to be caused exclusively by a 
causal link between R&D intensity and GDP per capita as the relation between the share of R&D in GDP and the size of the 
working population is also positive.  
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
EU 15 and EU 25 have been omitted from regression. 
 
2.2.2  A larger knowledge base 
Besides lowering the average cost of firms in both production and research, economic 
integration also gives researchers access to a larger body of knowledge, thereby improving their 
productivity. 
The empirical evidence on the diffusion of technology across borders is substantial and has 
(largely) been documented by Keller (2004). One strand of the literature is concerned with the 
relation between R&D and productivity and traces back to the Griliches (1979) and Jaffe 
(1986).
11 Coe and Helpman (1995) and Coe et al. (1997) have shown that not only domestic but 
also foreign R&D contributes to productivity. Jacobs et al. (2002) arrive at similar conclusions 
in a study of sectoral productivity growth in the Netherlands. 
A complication that arises with this approach is that R&D can lead to higher productivity 
through innovation but also through imitation – the two faces of R&D emphasised by Cohen 
and Levinthal (1989). Levin et al. (1987) show that imitation is far from costless. They estimate 
that imitating a new invention can cost between 50 and 75 percent of what the original 
invention had cost. In two recent contributions Griffith et al. (2003) and Griffith et al. (2004) 
separate the effects of imitation and innovation and find that both channels are important for 
productivity growth, although imitation becomes less important if a country lies closer to the 
productivity frontier. 
 
11 Los and Verspagen (2006) provide a survey.  
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A more direct approach, which mainly captures the standing-on-shoulders type of knowledge 
diffusion is to measure diffusion using data on patent citations. In an early survey Griliches 
(1990) advocates the use of patent data because it does not require strong assumptions about the 
structure of spillovers that is required when trying to link R&D with productivity. Three years 
later Jaffe et al. (1993) presented evidence suggesting that knowledge diffusion is 
predominantly a local phenomenon. They found that the probability of one patent citing 
domestic patents is larger than foreign patents, that the probability of citing a patent from the 
same US-state is larger, and that the probability of citing a patent from the same region is larger 
again. This is a remarkable result as they controlled for the location of production. As 
production activities tend to be geographically clustered, it would not be a surprise to find back 
this clustering in patents that apply to the same product or production process. Jaffe et al. show 
that patent citations tend to be local even after the geographical clustering due to the clustering 
of production is taken into account. Later studies by, amongst others, Maurseth and Verspagen 
(2002) arrive at the same conclusions.
12 Using other approaches Keller (2002) and Thompson 
(2004) also have confirmed the findings of Jaffe at al. 
 A next question is whether knowledge diffusion is becoming less local over time. Some 
recent evidence suggests that this indeed the case. Using a new database on the diffusion of 
technologies, Comin et al. (2006) report that the rate of convergence between countries within a 
technology typically is around four percent per year and that the speed of convergence for 
technologies developed after 1925 is three times higher than for older technologies. 
 
Summarising, the empirical literature on the diffusion of technology shows that knowledge does 
not stop at a country’s border but also that knowledge does tend to be local in nature. Economic 
integration can lead to a larger knowledge base, but the extent of this effect is limited by the 
local nature of knowledge. Whether the diffusion of knowledge across borders is likely to 
discourage innovation policy at the national level is discussed in the succeeding chapters. 
 
12 Thompson and Fox Kean (2005a, 2005b) claim, in a reassessment of the article by Jaffe et al. (1993), that the local nature 
of patent citations is largely spurious and can be ascribed to inadequate control for the location of production. Henderson et 
al. (2005), however, pointed out that the alternative of Thompson and Fox-Kean is likely to have suffered from sample-
selection bias  
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3  Subsidiarity of innovation policy 
Should innovation policy be coordinated in the European Union or should it be left to the 
Member States? Ederveen et al. (2006) list several reasons for centralisation, but also for 
decentralisation, of policy (of any kind) at the European level. The main reasons for 
centralisation are economies of scale and policy externalities. Economies of scale in innovation 
policy can arise if designing and executing policy involve substantial fixed cost. Policy 
externalities arise if a country’s innovation policy has unintended effects on other countries. 
Policy coordination can internalise these policy externalities. In fact, this internalisation is a 
kind of scale economy as innovation policy at a larger scale is less vulnerable to leakages across 
the border. Among the reasons for country-specific innovation policy are differences between 
Member States in preferences regarding innovation and innovation policy and heterogeneity in 
existing innovation policies. 
In this report we make a distinction between three levels of policy integration: centralisation 
(policy executed by the EC), multilateral cooperation between national governments and 
independent national policies (no policy integration).
13 The advantages of centralisation are that 
fixed cost can be minimised and that policy externalities can be fully internalised. A 
disadvantage is that individual Member States cannot adjust innovation policy to local 
circumstances and preferences. Multilateral cooperation leaves more scope for local fine-tuning, 
but does not minimise fixed cost. The main benefit of cooperation over independent national 
policies is the internalisation of policy externalities. This chapter discusses scale economies and 
externalities in innovation policy and concludes with some remarks on heterogeneity of 
Member States. 
3.1  Economies of scale due to fixed cost 
In general, centralisation of policy might be more efficient than national policy because the 
fixed cost of public administration have to be incurred only once, instead of for every Member 
State. For example, if a policy needs to be implemented only at the European level, this will 
save the cost of implementation for each individual Member State. The same argument applies 
to the monitoring and enforcement of regulation. In particular, the selection and evaluation of 
research proposals require expertise that can be maintained more efficiently at a larger scale. 
The European Patent Office (EPO) is an example of how centralisation can reduce the cost of 
maintaining expertise in a wide range of fields (see Chapter 7). 
 
13 The distinction made here is a conceptual simplification that does not fully correspond to the actual organisation of the EU. 
One interpretation is that policy centralisation reflects the “Community Method” of the first pillar of the EU and that policy 
cooperation reflects the “Intergovernmental Method” adopted under the second and third pillar. Within the Community 
Method a second division can be made between a “regulation” and a “directive” . The latter only formulates goals and comes 
close to what is meant by cooperation.  
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Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) present evidence on economies of scale in public administration. 
They hypothesise that the cost of adopting a law are (approximately) independent of the size of 
a country. This makes the adoption of a law cheaper for large countries than for small ones. In 
accordance, large countries are expected to have a greater number of laws than small countries. 
Their empirical study shows that U.S. states with a larger population have more laws and adopt 
certain laws earlier than smaller states. In addition, Mulligan and Shleifer have conducted an 
analysis for a panel of 73 countries. Again they found evidence indicating that the size of a 
jurisdiction matters for the amount of regulation. For education and health, Dao (1995) shows 
that their provision is subject to scale economies in countries with large populations. Finally, 
Cohn et al. (1989) present some evidence on economies of scale in the public sector for 
research and graduate teaching based on U.S. data for 1981-82. 
3.2  Policy externalities 
The presence of policy externalities provides a second rationale for European coordination of 
innovation policy. Policy externalities arise when a national policy of a Member State has 
unintended consequences for another Member State Ederveen et al. (2006). A national R&D 
subsidy, for example, can benefit research beyond the borders of the domestic economy. If a 
government is not concerned with the favourable effects of its subsidy on other countries, the 
amount of subsidy is too small from a European perspective. A national policy might also have 
a negative effect on other countries. For example, a country might fail to protect the intellectual 
property of foreign firms, thereby facilitating imitation by domestic firms.  
Both positive and negative policy externalities give rise to a prisoner’s dilemma,
14 if all 
countries involved benefit from cooperation. Both centralisation and cooperation can be used to 
solve such a dilemma. The credibility of agreements can be ensured by legally binding treaties. 
In extreme cases, however, negative policy externalities do not lead to a prisoner’s dilemma 
because not all countries would benefit from cooperation. A text-book example is a tax-heaven. 
Small countries like Monaco, Liechtenstein or Andorra, have nothing to gain from raising their 
tax-levels in order to reduce negative policy externalities. 
Regarding innovation policy, the nature of policy externalities differs with the kind of 
market failure that a policy is concerned with. A subset of the market failures discussed in 
Section 2.1 can lead to policy externalities: 
•  Knowledge diffusion 
•  Buyer surplus 
•  Inefficient standardisation 
 
 
14 In case of positive externalities it is more appropriate to refer to a ‘free-rider’ problem.  
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Knowledge diffusion. Three forms of knowledge diffusion have been mentioned in Section 
2.1.1: imitation in markets not served by the innovator, imitation by competitors and 
applications of innovations unintended by the innovator. The policy externality induced by the 
first kind of diffusion, imitation in other markets, can in principle be solved by policies 
promoting economic integration, like reducing barriers to trade and investment. Policy 
cooperation in the field of IPR protection can reduce this externality as well. 
As there is little incentive for individual Member States to prevent imitation by domestic 
firms from foreign companies, also the presence of imitation offers a scope for supra-national 
policy. If countries are similar in terms of the relative incidence of imitation by domestic firms, 
both centralisation of policy and cooperation regarding the protection of intellectual property 
can provide a solution to the prisoner’s dilemma. When some countries benefit more from 
imitation than others do, there is an incentive to avoid or frustrate agreement. 
Also diffusion of knowledge leading to unintended innovations brings about a policy 
externality. Individual Member States do not have an incentive to promote the diffusion of 
knowledge across national borders, which results not only in a slower diffusion of knowledge 
within the EU, but also in a bias towards domestically oriented industries. This kind of policy 
externality can be internalised by promoting economic integration, in particular by removing 
barriers to knowledge diffusion across borders. 
 
Surplus of foreign buyers. National policymakers that would like to reduce market failure due to 
buyer surpluses face a free-rider problem, in particular for innovations applied in high-trade 
sectors. Suppose a subsidy on R&D-expenditure is given to a firm in order to stimulate 
innovation, then part of the benefits of the subsidy will accrue to customers of the firm in other 
countries. In an integrated European market, there could be an incentive for Member States to 
reduce or abolish subsidies to R&D while still profiting from the innovations subsidised by 
other countries. Centralisation and cooperation can be used to internalise this policy externality. 
 
Inefficient standardisation. As standards are typically intended for use in several countries – if 
not for use world-wide – a free-rider problem will arise if countries are unwilling to cooperate 
on policies promoting efficient standardisation. Supra-national organisations like the EC 
therefore seem better suited for monitoring and facilitating the development of standards by 
SSOs and private companies than individual Member States are.  
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3.3  Heterogeneity 
The previous two sections have provided an array of arguments in favour of centralising 
innovation policy at the European level. However, centralisation also has its cost. Keeping 
innovation policy at the national level has three potential benefits (Pelkmans (2006) and 
Ederveen et al. (2006)): 
 
•  Adaptation to local circumstances, 
•  Learning from a diversity of experiences and 
•  Better incentives for policymakers through policy competition. 
 
In the context of innovation policy, local circumstances are important not just because 
preferences tend to differ from one country to another, but also because of differences in 
innovation systems. Carlsson (2006) concludes from a literature survey that although national 
innovation systems are internationalising, they still require support from national institutions. 
Foray (1995), for instance, argues that intellectual property rights regimes are so closely linked 
with innovation systems that standardisation of these regimes would cause a reduction in the 
diversity of those systems. Diversity in innovation systems would be important, according to 
him, because it positively contributes to scientific and technological change. 
A second benefit of decentralisation also has to do with maintaining diversity. Governments 
adopting different innovation policies can learn from each other which policies are the most 
effective. While centralisation leads to a complete loss of diversity within the EU, a degree of 
diversity is still possible in case of multilateral cooperation. 
Greater accountability of policymakers is a third potential benefit of decentralisation. 
Tiebout (1956) presents a theoretical model in which policy competition arises because voters 
can migrate from one region to another (see also Pelkmans (2006)). Instead of voters, also 
multinational companies may trigger policy competition. Member States with a more effective 
innovation policy might attract more foreign investment, such that underperforming Member 
States will be under pressure of adjusting their innovation policy. The availability of 
benchmarks from other Member States provides an additional incentive for policymakers to 
improve.  
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4  Public investment in R&D 
Public R&D is the most direct form of innovation policy that one can imagine. Both the funding 
and execution of R&D are performed by the government. As such, it can be distinguished from 
public funding of private R&D, which will be the subject of Chapter 5. Public R&D 
encompasses research and development by publicly owned enterprises like hospitals and by 
defence among others. We include research at public universities (or by higher education in 
general) in public R&D as both the expenditure and execution is governed by the government.  
 
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the structure and magnitude of public expenditure on R&D. 
Remarkably, the United States and Japan are very close to the EU average – not only for total 
public expenditure but also for government expenditure and higher education expenditure 
individually. Figure 4.1 shows that in Finland and Sweden no less than 1% of GDP is spend by 
the government on research and development, while it is only 0.2% of GDP in Luxembourg and 
several new Member States. 
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
 
Why does the government participate in R&D instead of passing it over to the market? The 
most immediate answer to this question is that public research is not a perfect substitute for 
private research as public R&D is less susceptible to market forces. This is not just a 
disadvantage: the insensitivity of public R&D to markets enables a freer exchange of 
knowledge than is the case for private R&D, at least if the knowledge developed by public  
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R&D is publicly available. This holds for example for basic science, but less for defence-related 
public R&D. Freer diffusion of knowledge makes public R&D more likely to benefit from 
increasing returns to scale than private R&D.  
4.1  Scale economies 
Public research is subject to the same kind of scale economies as private research, a topic which 
has been discussed in Section 2.1.6. First, scale economies can arise from the presence of fixed 
cost. Some research projects are too large and risky to be undertaken by a single country. 
Multilateral cooperation then enables R&D projects that would otherwise not have been 
undertaken. A concrete example of a large European public R&D project is the Galileo satellite 
navigation system, which is a joint venture of the EC and the ESA with a budget of several 
billions of Euros. 
A second type of scale economies stems from the internalisation of externalities. Not only 
the policy externalities introduced in Section 3.2 are relevant here, but also some of the 
externalities for private research described in Section 2.1. In particular, European coordination 
of public research can improve the diffusion of knowledge between countries, thereby 
establishing a larger knowledge base with more specialised researchers and less duplication of 
research (Section 2.2.2). 
A larger scale of the economy fosters competition between researchers and induces 
specialisation among them. This improves their productivity and warrants a larger share of 
public spending in larger countries if knowledge would not diffuse to abroad. Whether the scale 
of the domestic economy really matters, depends on the openness of public R&D institutes and 
universities. An internationally oriented university, for example, will employ specialised 
researchers from various countries who publish in international journals even when this 
university is located in a small country. In the related area of higher education (not research in 
higher education, but education itself), Thissen and Ederveen (2006) show that scale economies 
are absent.  
The risk of duplication in research matters for public just as for private R&D. In both cases 
it leads to overinvestment in R&D, to which international coordination might be an answer. For 
R&D in general, Jones and Williams (2000) investigate the impact of this duplication- and other 
effects to show whether there is too much or too few R&D. They start with a theoretical model 
in which several market imperfections are integrated – some leading to too much R&D, others 
imply to too few. Their application is, however, hampered by the lack of empirical evidence on 
size and impact of each element. They conclude that countries typically invest too little in 
R&D, which points at the importance of positive externalities like knowledge spillovers. In 
addition, they show that countries only invest too much in R&D in the exceptional case where 
the stepping on toes effect (duplication) is very large.  
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University-industry relations: Does the European knowledge paradox require a European solution? 
Compared to the United States, collaboration between universities and private companies is rather scant in European 
countries. This lack of collaboration is remarkable considering that European universities are quite productive in terms of 
high-quality output. The combination of high scientific productivity with little knowledge exchange between the public 
and private sectors has been coined the European knowledge paradox. In a recent report, Canton et al. (2005) propose 
five types of public policy that should stimulate the spillovers between public and private research: 
 
•  Provide incentives for scientists to engage in university-industry interaction 
•  Provide preconditions for entrepreneurship in academia 
•  Improve the match in research activities 
•  Increase absorptive capacity of private firms 
•  Be ‘intelligent’ with venture capital for private firms 
 
The first two points are concerned with the functioning of European universities in comparison with the US. The Bayh-
Dole act in the US allows universities to patent and share the subsequent revenues with inventors, which has greatly 
encouraged  scientists  to  bring  their  inventions  to  the  market.  In  addition,  many  US  universities  have  Technology 
Transfer  Offices  (TTOs)  that  aid  researchers  with  commercialisation  of  their  inventions.  Similar  policies  could  be 
introduced in Europe, but there are no obvious scale effects or externalities that would warrant European coordination. 
However,  the  conditions  applying  to  public  research  funded  by  the  EC  can  be  adapted  to  facilitate  public-private 
cooperation. 
 
The last three points refer predominantly to public funding of private research. For example, thematic funding of public-
private research projects can help to close the gap between the research agenda’s of universities and companies. 
Public funding of private R&D can also improve the absorptive capacity of firms, thereby enabling them to better benefit 
from public research. The report further advocates the use of independent experts for allocating publicly funded venture 
capital. Whether European coordination is desirable for public funding of private R&D or venture capital is discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.  
 
An alternative reason for duplication of research is that governments may spend some minimum 
amount on public research just in order to maintain some knowledge in various fields of 
science. This argument is especially relevant for smaller countries, like Malta and Cyprus. 
 
The evidence on the relative size of each of the scale effects is still very limited. We 
hypothesise that international knowledge spillovers, which make it difficult to appropriate the 
return to R&D, dominate the duplication effect and lead to underinvestment in public R&D. 
These scale effects will be particularly important for small economies – larger economies are 
able to internalise a larger share of the return to R&D. This line of reasoning implies therefore 
that the GDP-share of public R&D increases with the size of an economy. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the existence of scale economies in public R&D. The figure contains a 
scatter plot of the relative size of public R&D on the vertical axis against the size of the 
economy measured in terms of GDP. The relative size of public R&D is measured as the share  
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of public R&D expenditure in total government expenditure.
15 The absolute size of GDP is 
measured in billions of euros purchasing power parity (ppp).
16 The horizontal scale is 
logarithmic because the differences between countries increase with the level of expenditure. A 
regression-line has been added based on OLS-estimation. There appears to be a positive 
association between the scale of the economy and the amount of public R&D.
17 A country, say 
France, which is ten times (in terms of GDP) than another country, say Ireland, has on average a 
1%-point larger share of public R&D in government spending. The exceptions to the rule that 
larger countries spend relatively more on R&D are also clearly visible from Figure 4.2: despite 
their limited scale Scandinavian countries like Finland, Sweden and Iceland spend relatively 
much on public R&D. 
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
EU 15 and EU 25 have been omitted from regression. 
 
Economies of scale provide a likely explanation for the pattern found in Figure 4.2. Large 
countries may internalise a larger share of the return to public R&D, which induces them to 
spend relatively more on public R&D. If the efficiency of R&D expenditure indeed increases 
with its scale, this relation should not only be present for public R&D but also for private R&D. 
 
15 Alternatively, the share of public R&D in GDP can be used. This would reduce the vertical gap between the EU and the 
USA. The share of public R&D in government expenditure has been chosen in order to take into account heterogeneity in 
preferences for the size of government across countries. If the inhabitants of a country tend to have an appetite for a small 
government it is likely that a larger part of R&D expenditure will come from private sources. In particular, a lot of fundamental 
research in the USA is privately funded. 
16 Other indicators of scale like the size of the working population of the absolute size of public R&D reveal similar patterns. 
17 The coefficient is 0.0024 with a heteroscedasticity robust standard error of 0.0012. Number of observations is 31.  
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Indeed, as Figure 2.1 has already shown, a scale effect is visible for private R&D expenditure as 
well. 
A tentative conclusion, which may be drawn from Figure 4.2 is that the European Union has 
some potential to exploit the scale economies in public R&D. Its share of public R&D in 
government expenditures are below the regression line, let alone the gap with the United States. 
The European Union might be able to internalise a larger share of the return to R&D than each 
individual Member State. Section 4.2 focuses on one important source for scale economies: the 
internalisation of cross-border externalities. 
4.2  Externalities 
The presence of cross-border externalities may limit the benefits of public R&D for the 
domestic country, which is the second motivation for European coordination of public R&D 
expenditure. There are several reasons why public R&D benefits not only the home country, but 
other Member States as well. The most prominent reason is knowledge diffusion across borders. 
Section 2.2 has shown for private R&D that neighbouring countries benefit from the 
diffusion of knowledge. For knowledge developed via public R&D this diffusion might be even 
stronger, as the resulting knowledge is often publicly available. International diffusion might 
even be an aim of public R&D, in particular for scientific research (see box The two objectives 
of public research). Despite this explicit goal, the presence of international leakages reduce the 
incentives for internationally oriented (open) countries to invest in public R&D. Open countries 
can quite easily acquire knowledge abroad, but benefit to a relatively small extent from own 
research. 
This line of reasoning presumes a positive impact of public R&D on private sector 
performance, not only at home but in foreign countries as well. Part of the empirical literature 
on the economic impact of public R&D indeed supports this view. A recent review noted that 
“attempts to calculate the returns to public research have generally resulted in high rates of 
return, from 20 to 50% and higher” (Scott et al. (2002)) This contrast, however, sharply with the 
observation of the OECD (2003) that output growth is positively related to private R&D, but 
not to public R&D. This finding can be due to the fact that cross-border diffusion of knowledge 
weakens the relation between national GDP and national public R&D. Another possible 
explanation for the result is that publicly performed R&D may be ‘crowding out’ resources that 
could alternatively be used by the private sector, so that publicly funded R&D is displacing 
private investment in science and technology.  
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The two objectives of public research 
Public expenditure on research is not exclusively the domain of innovation policy. Besides enhancing the economic 
performance, the pursuit of knowledge can also be an objective by itself. The two objectives of public research are 
reflected in the direct expenditure on R&D by government institutes and the expenditure on research performed at 
universities. The government institutes have the objective of supporting sectors of the domestic economy, whereas 
universities  are  traditionally more  concerned  with  discovery  for  its  own  sake  –  although  European  universities  are 
increasingly urged to perform R&D directly useful for the private sector (see previous box University-industry relations). 
The different perspectives on the role of public research imply a different attitude towards the diffusion of knowledge to 
other countries. Government R&D intended to support local economic activity is not actively diffused abroad because it 
is generally tailored to local needs and because it should not benefit foreign competitors. Universities, in contrast, see 
international dissemination of knowledge as essential to their performance. In particular, the status and rewards of 
researchers  at  universities  depend  on  publications  in  internationally  read  scientific  journals.  University  research  is 
therefore more likely to result in international diffusion of knowledge than government R&D. 
 
What are the consequences of the dual objectives of public R&D on the presence of policy externalities? Government 
R&D is likely to be confined to areas with a low probability of knowledge leaking abroad. For these areas, expenditure 
on government R&D will not be affected by a policy externality. For other areas of research, the risk of knowledge 
leaking abroad reduces the incentive for government R&D and leads to a policy externality. The ‘idealistic’ objective for 
the funding of university research suggests that policy externalities are less likely to occur here. Governments would 
have fewer problems with the strong international diffusion of university research if its primary objective is the pursuit of 
knowledge. In order to see whether the objectives of public R&D matter for the presence of policy externalities, we have 
plotted the ratio of expenditure on university R&D to government research against foreign patent ownership. For most 
Member States the R&D ratio lies just below two, except for the extremely open countries like Luxemburg where the 
ratio is much smaller. The R&D ratio for the EU is similar to that of the USA and Japan, which suggests that the 
influence of the extremely open countries is negligible. In general, we can conclude that expenditure on university R&D 
tends to respond in the same way to leakage of knowledge as government R&D. Both types of research are equally 
vulnerable  to  policy  externalities  –  with  possibly  an  exception  for  countries  where  leakage  is  extreme.  For  these 
countries, expenditure on university research is relatively small. 
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
Luxemburg, EU 15 and EU 25 have been omitted from regression.  
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Even at the regional level, a strong influence of public R&D (generally by universities) on the 
business sector cannot be robustly observed. According to Zucker et al. (1998), proximity with 
public labs and universities is of no use for improving innovation. A more recent study by 
Ronde and Hussler (2005) observe a positive, but still moderate impact. Empirical studies point, 
however, at the presence of positive effects if deliberate interactions with scientists are 
undertaken. 
  
One might hypothesise therefore that international diffusion of knowledge causes small and 
open economies to spend relatively little on public R&D. The relation regarding the size of the 
economy has been confirmed in the previous section. A straightforward way of verifying 
whether cross-border externalities affect public expenditure on R&D is to test if public R&D is 
negatively associated with the openness of Member States. In open economies it can be 
expected that the benefits of public R&D are more likely to ‘leak’ to other countries than in 
closed economies. Therefore governments of countries with an open economy might be less 
inclined to spend on R&D. 
 
In this context, we have used the proportion of patents on domestic inventions that is owned by 
foreigners as an indicator of openness. In order to ensure international comparability, the 
proportion of foreign-owned patents is based on patents granted by the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO). Figure 4.3 shows a rather pronounced negative association 
between public R&D expenditure and the proportion of patents owned by foreigners.
18 
Remarkable is the extremely high proportion of foreign ownership for the former communistic 
countries. After the Iron Curtain was drawn western multinationals en masse patented 
inventions that were not accessible to them before. 
 
The negative association between public R&D expenditure and foreign ownership of patents 
suggests that governments are indeed sensitive to ‘leakage’ of benefits from public R&D to 
abroad.
19 The leakage is larger at the Member State level (also for larger countries) than for the 
EU as a whole, because the leakage between EU Member States remains within the EU. 
The share of expenditure on public R&D in the EU is small compared to the US and Japan – 
possibly as a result of a free-rider problem in the EU. Assuming the association between 
relative expenditure on public R&D and the share of foreign-owned patents reflects a causal 
relation, centralising public expenditure on R&D at the European level could raise the EU 
budget for public R&D to a level comparable to that of the United States or Japan. 
 
18 The coefficient on the share of foreign-owned patents is -0.0278, with a heteroskedasticity robust standard error of 0.004 
and an adjusted R
2 of 0.71. Number of observations is 21. Excluding countries for which more than 95% of all patents are 
owned by foreigners yielded a coefficient of -0.0214 and a standard error of 0.004. 
19 This effect should not be overstated, though, as the similar analysis for the relation of public R&D with the share of high-
tech export in GDP does not confirm this negative relationship between openness and public R&D.  
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
EU 15 and EU 25 have been omitted from regression. 
 
As openness and scale are negatively related,
20 it is possible that the apparent effects of scale 
could merely reflect openness or vice versa. Regression analysis, which is available upon 
request, offers a possibility to distinguish between the effects of scale and openness. Adding the 
share of foreign-owned patents to the log of GDP as explanatory variable of public R&D 
expenditures leads to a reduction in the coefficient on log GDP. The coefficient on scale 
becomes statistically insignificant, whereas the coefficient on openness remains significantly 
negative. This suggests that the scale effect merely reflects the effects of cross-border 
externalities represented by foreign share-ownership. 
4.3  Heterogeneity 
All three arguments for heterogeneous national policies discussed in Section 3.3 apply to public 
R&D. First, at least part of public R&D tries to solve local problems, like research for dike 
construction in the Dutch province of Zeeland. This does not exclude, however, the possibility 
that this knowledge spills over to other countries, like to New Orleans in the United States or 
Venice in Italy. Still, it limits the scope for European coordination, as most other Member 
States are much less interested in dikes. Second, heterogeneity allows different governments to 
 
20 An additional regression shows that the coefficient of foreign-owned patents on the log of public R&D expenditure is -5.06, 
with a standard error of 0.79 and an adjusted R
2 of 0.64. If high-tech exports are used as a measure for openness instead of 
foreign patent, the statistical relations with public R&D expenditures is not significant.   
  39 
seek for different answers to similar problems. This facilitates the learning from each other. 
Third, diversity in public R&D may in the long run lead to the most efficient type of R&D. In 
particular, if multinationals are among the recipients of the public innovations, governments 
may be induced to seek for the highest efficiency in public R&D.  
Public R&D differs from country to country; some spend a lot, others spend a bit (Figure 
4.1). However, for the question of subsidiarity also the composition of public R&D matters. An 
indication of the variety in composition is provided by Figure 4.4, showing the socio-economic 
objectives of government expenditures on R&D in a selection of OECD countries for which 
these data are available. 
At first sight, the figure clearly points at significant heterogeneity in the objectives of public 
R&D. Part of this heterogeneity can be explained from the industry structure of the countries. 
Public R&D is aimed at activities or sectors in which a country is ‘large’. In industrial countries 
like Germany and Japan, a lot of public R&D expenditure is focused on industrial production, 
whereas Denmark and Portugal spend higher fractions on research oriented towards agriculture. 
For the Netherlands, the presence of an agricultural university (currently renamed as the leading 
European university in the life sciences) in a historically agricultural country and the presence 
of a university of technology in the industrial city Eindhoven illustrates this relationship.  
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
The category “university” does not correspond to the category “higher education” of Figure 4.1. 
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Specialisation of public R&D in domestically large sectors maximises the domestic return and 
minimises the leakage of knowledge to other countries. It reduces therefore the need for 
European coordination. In addition, the mere presence of heterogeneity reduces the scope of 
European involvement in public R&D. 
4.4  Subsidiarity in public R&D 
There are many theoretical arguments supporting scale effects in public R&D and we have 
found some empirical indications that larger countries spend relatively more on R&D. Our 
(regression) analysis suggests that a major source of scale effects is the internalisation of policy 
externalities stemming from the diffusion of knowledge across borders. European coordination 
of expenditure on public R&D alone could provide sufficient incentives for Member States to 
spend relatively the same amount on public R&D as Japan and the US. The fact that countries 
are inclined to spend more public R&D towards relatively large sectors in the economy supports 
this conclusion. The heterogeneity across countries in the socio-economic objectives of R&D, 
however, could hamper European coordination of public R&D.  
We conclude that European coordination of public R&D could be beneficial because policy 
externalities seem to hamper spending on public R&D. If the Member States of the European 
Union agree to increase expenditures on public R&D, all Member States could benefit. The 
European Commission should also be involved in public R&D projects where the scale really 
matters – such as the ITER-programme on nuclear fusion – and to basic science where 
international specialisation is important. This does not imply that all public R&D should be 
performed by the European Commission. Given the differences in national socio-economic 
objectives on public R&D it seems reasonable that the Member States themselves determine to 
their objectives to some extent. There the role of the European Commission could be limited to 
facilitate an agreement on increases in R&D spending – like the Lisbon targets – and to monitor 
Member States progress. National action plans seem to be a good format for this.   
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5  Public funding of private R&D 
A second type of innovation policy is government funding of private R&D, which includes 
direct subsidies and tax credits. Its size is quite limited in most European countries, ranging 
between less than 0.1% of government expenditures in a couple of new Member States to 0.6% 
in Great Britain, France, Sweden and Germany. Quite remarkable is the large share of public 
funding in the United States of more than 1% of the government budget, mainly attributable to 
innovation by private firms for the US Department of Defence.  
The current chapter investigates whether public funding of private R&D should be 
coordinated at the European level. Before, it should be notified that the outcomes of 
econometric research on the usefulness of public funding are ambiguous. The key question is 
whether public funding complements or crowds out private expenditure. Just counting empirical 
studies, García-Quevedo (2004) shows that about half of the empirical studies (38 out of 74) 
point at complementarity, in which public funding really increases total expenditure on private 
R&D. However, the remaining studies either point at substitutability (17 studies), in which 
public funding crowds out private expenditure, or find no relation at all (remaining 19 studies). 
After an extensive meta-analysis, García-Quevedo concludes that “(t)he econometric evidence 
on the relation between public funding of business R&D and private R&D expenditure is 
ambiguous.”
21 
A useful distinction in the public funding of business R&D is between tax credits and direct 
subsidies.
22 The primary difference in execution between these two policy instruments is that 
the former typically allows the private firms to choose projects, whereas the latter usually is 
accompanied by a government directed project choice. David et al. (2000) argue that tax credits 
are likely to favour projects that will generate greater profits in the short run, rather than 
projects with high social rates of return. Direct subsidies seem more appropriate to stimulate 
projects with high social rates of return, and are therefore less likely to crowd out private 
investments. The data used in this Chapter refer to direct subsidies and public procurement, and 
do not include tax-credits. 
5.1  Scale economies 
According to Figure 2.1, there are some indications for economies of scale in private R&D. 
These are relevant for the question whether public funding of private R&D needs European 
coordination: if a private research project has a multinational character, funding by a single 
country could be inadequate. In such a situation several countries could individually contribute 
or a single country could handle the project, passing the bill to other countries. 
 
21 See David et al. (2000) for a similar conclusion from a review of the econometric evidence. 
22 Tax credits are usually not included in the statistics on private funding. Conceptually, however, they belong to it, being a 
financial stimulus for private R&D.  
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Less likely are economies of scale in the public administration of R&D subsidies or tax credits. 
Tax credits are fiscal instruments which should be incorporated in the national tax systems. 
Direct subsidies are likely to be targeted at specific projects or particular firms. Only if the scale 
of these projects or firms cross the national borders may scale economies play a role.  
In an attempt to measure scale economies we plot the share of public funding in total 
government expenditure plotted in Figure 5.1 against the scale of the economy in terms of 
GDP.
23 Note that we have to ignore the role of tax credits in stimulating innovation here 
because lack of data, although the size of these credits could be substantial.  
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A.  
Public funding only comprises direct transfers, not tax credits. 
EU 15 and EU 25 have been omitted from regression. 
 
A positive association between public funding of private R&D and the scale of the economy is 
clearly present.
24 Also striking is the fact that public funding is much more important in the 
United States than in Japan. A possible explanation for this the outsourcing of R&D by the US 
Department of Defence to the business sector and the presence of large conglomerates 
(keiretsu’s) in Japan, which possibly reduces the need for government funding. Within Europe, 
the three largest countries, Germany, the UK and France, spend a relatively large share of the 
 
23 Alternatively, the size of private R&D could be used as measure of scale. The resulting picture would again point at the 
presence of economies of scale.  
24 The estimated coefficient between log GDP as measure for scale and public expenditure on private R&D is 0.0009. The 
heteroskedasticity robust standard error is 0.0003 and this explains 39% of the variation in the data. The number of 
observations is 30.   
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their budgets to the public funding of private R&D. Relative to its size, the Netherlands spends 
less public funds on private R&D than most other countries. 
 
5.2  Externalities 
Cross border externalities are significant in private R&D, see Section 2.2. In particular, the 
impact of R&D on foreign productivity is significant (Keller (2004)), though the evidence on 
foreign patents are less clear cut (Jaffe et al. (1993)). These externalities likely matter for the 
public funding of private R&D, insofar national governments stimulate foreign productivity. 
Externalities may also play a role in the subsidy or tax credit itself, in particular if these 
public funds accrue to internationally operating firms. The risk that multinationals use the 
subsidy to fund R&D in foreign affiliates causes governments to impose the condition that the 
subsidy is used locally, which increases the regulatory burden and reduces the opportunities to 
subsidise. 
These considerations lead to the expectation that governments in open economies spend 
relatively less on R&D subsidies or tax credits. The empirical support for this thesis is, 
however, surprisingly weak. Figure 5.2 shows a weakly (not statistically significant) negative 
relation between the share of public funding in total government expenditures and the share of 
foreign-owned patents. Even less significant is the same picture with the share of high-tech 
exports as a measure of openness. This suggests that internalisation of possible cross-border 
externalities is not a significant source for the economies of scale pointed out in Section 5.1. 
This lack of evidence for externalities in public funding of private R&D might have several 
explanations. First, governments are able to target their funds to domestically oriented firms. 
Second, the outcome of public research is more likely to cross a country’s borders than is the 
case for private R&D, as private firms try to protect their innovations. Third, private R&D tends 
to be larger in open economies (with a large share of high-tech exports). Ceteris paribus, this 
leads to more public funding in open economies, which at least partially offsets the 
hypothesised negative relationship. 
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
EU 15 and EU 25 have been omitted from regression. 
 
5.3  Heterogeneity 
How heterogeneous is the public funding of private R&D? One measure of heterogeneity is the 
socio-economic objective of the public funds. Figure 4.4 has shown the great diversity in the 
total public expenditures on R&D. Unfortunately, the total expenditures are not subdivided in 
public funding of private R&D and public funding of public R&D, but it is likely that a similar 
heterogeneity as in Figure 4.4 also holds for this public funding of private R&D. For example, 
Abramovsky et al. (2004) conclude from an analysis of the Third Community Innovation 
Survey (CIS 3) results that a large part of heterogeneity in innovation behaviour can be 
explained by differences in the relative importance of industries. Mohnen et al. (2006) confirm 
the heterogeneity in private innovation, but dispute the explanation from industry heterogeneity. 
They conclude that a large part of the variation in innovation across seven European countries 
remains difficult to explain using micro-aggregated data from CIS 1. 
A second difference between countries is the design of public funding, for example in the 
way firms have to apply for these funds. Already mentioned is the distinction between subsidies 
and tax credits. Policies may also differ in the open character of their funds. On one side, firms 
may have to compete for the available funds (like in the American SBIR program). At the other 
extreme, governments may choose to subsidise a single firm without allowing other firms to 
apply.  
  45 
Finally, countries differ significantly in the amount of sources they devote to the funding of 
private R&D, as has already been discussed in the light of Figure 5.1. This point is reinforced in 
Figure 5.3, which displays the composition of private R&D by sector of funding. Two 
immediate conclusions can be drawn from this figure. First, the variation in private R&D is 
even stronger between countries than it is for public R&D. Second, government funding is 
rather unimportant compared to the funding by businesses themselves. 
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Source: Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
The shares of “higher education” are negligible. 
 
5.4  Subsidiarity in public funding of private R&D 
Scale economies do seem to be present in the public funding of private R&D: firms in large 
countries spend more on R&D and are more heavily subsidised, but cross-border externalities 
do not appear to be the reason for this outcome. The presence of externalities in private R&D 
substantiates government involvement in general, but it is questionable whether policy 
externalities cause national support of private R&D to be insufficient. A possible explanation 
for this finding is that governments normally restrict the use of subsidies and tax-credits to 
domestic R&D, such that leakage of public funds is considered to be minimal.  
The economies of scale are a motivation for greater involvement of the European 
Commission in the funding of private R&D. One has to be aware that the diversity in type and 
amount of public funds for private R&D across Member States is large. This justifies a  
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substantial role for national governments in handling this diversity. Greater European 
involvement could be fine, but priority should remain with national policy.  
 
A different issue is the role of the EU in the Lisbon-goal of spending 3% GDP on R&D. A 
common goal may ask for coordinated action. Whether a target of 3% is feasible or not, 
coordinated action provides an incentive for national governments to learn from each other and 
improve their competitiveness. In any case, the evidence presented in this chapter does not 
advise against the coordination of the public funding of private R&D, but national objectives 
should be served by national policies.  
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6  SMEs, entrepreneurship and venture capital 
Innovation is not limited to ‘formal’ R&D by large companies: often innovation takes place 
through the establishment of new firms, like during the boom in information technology of the 
1990s. European governments have recognised the role of SMEs and entrepreneurship as has 
been reflected by a wide range of policies adopted in recent years.  
Probably the most important of these policies is deregulation. The OECD (2005) notes that 
regulatory reform is widespread in OECD countries. Reducing the amount of rules that SMEs 
are confronted with can greatly improve the incentives for running a small firm. In addition, 
governments can reduce the administrative burden of SMEs through initiatives like e-
governance and one-stop-shops. 
Governments are also actively involved in making financial resources available to SMEs. 
This has been done both directly by providing funding to start-up companies and indirectly 
through regulatory reform beneficial for venture capital. Among the latter type of policies are a 
more favourable tax-treatment of unlisted stocks, allowing pension funds to invest in venture 
capital and the stimulation of networks of “business angels”. 
A third category of SME policies aims to stimulate the diffusion of knowledge among SMEs 
and between SMEs and universities and other public research institutes. An example of such a 
policy is the Dutch “Innovation Voucher” experiment. The aim of the experiment was to 
promote the interaction between SMEs and public research institutes by giving randomly 
chosen SMEs a voucher for a research project. The experiment was a success in the sense that 
eight out of ten vouchers led to projects that would otherwise not have taken place (Cornet et al. 
(2006b)). 
Promoting an entrepreneurial spirit is another policy pursued by governments. This involves 
teaching children at school that self-employment is an alternative career and promoting 
entrepreneurship is by means of prizes and campaigns.  
 
From the perspective of economic theory, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) deserve 
special attention in innovation policy for at least two reasons:
25 
 
•  Imperfections in the capital market affect SMEs to a greater extent 
•  The cost of regulation are relatively high for SMEs 
 
SMEs can have more difficulty in financing R&D than large firms due to problems of 
asymmetric information (see Section 2.1.6). First, large firms typically are able to finance R&D 
via an ‘internal capital market’ from retained profits. Second, large firms have a reputation, 
while SMEs, especially start-ups, are less well known to potential investors. Governments can 
 
25 A rather large body of literature exists on the role of SMEs in regional systems of innovation. Recent studies in this area 
include Asheim (2004), Asheim and Coenen (2005) and Davenport (2005).  
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alleviate capital market imperfections through loans, subsidies and procurement targeted at 
SMEs and through encouraging private venture capital.  
Connell (2006) emphasises that procurement, rather than venture capital, is vital for the 
survival of small innovative firms. He makes a distinction between ‘soft’ companies that do 
research for customers and ‘hard’ companies that need venture capital for the production of 
standardised products. His report describes in detail how the Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) procurement programme of the United States’ government contributes to 
commercial innovation by ‘soft’ companies (more on SBIR in the box Heterogeneity in capital 
markets for start-up companies in Section 6.3). 
As the cost of regulation is largely independent of firm size, small companies will be 
disproportionately affected by administrative burdens. Not only will extensive regulation make 
it more difficult to start a firm, it will also make it more costly to make use of subsidies and 
other regulation intended to stimulate innovation. 
 
Although there are clear theoretical arguments in favour of innovation policy specifically aimed 
at SMEs, it is less clear why this kind of policy should be a European rather than national 
matter. The remainder of this chapter provides a discussion of this issue, focussing on the role 
of public funding for innovation by SMEs. 
6.1  Scale economies 
It is difficult to think of scale economies in public administration when it comes to public 
funding of SMEs. Scale can be somewhat advantageous with respect to the design and 
execution of policy. Procurement procedures can be handled more efficiently on a larger scale 
because it reduces the cost of maintaining the expertise of civil servants. However, scale is 
unlikely to affect the costs of monitoring small and medium-sized firms. Figure 6.1 offers an 
empirical confirmation of this argument. The figure draws on data from the Third Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS3), a survey among innovating firms in a number of European countries. 
In order to measure whether scale matters for SME policy, we have plotted the proportion of 
SMEs
26 that reported to have received public funding against the log of GDP. If one ignores the 
small number and proportion of SMEs receiving public funding in Iceland and Denmark, no 
obvious scale effects appear to be present. 
 
26 The data on SMEs refer to companies having between 10 and 249 employees that are “innovative”. The proportion was 
computed as the number of respondents answering “yes” divided by the number of respondents answering either “yes” or 
“no”.  
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Source: CIS3 (Eurostat); a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
Iceland, Denmark, EU 15 and EU 25 have been omitted from regression. 
 
Public funding is not the only method by which governments can enhance the access to capital 
of SMEs. Better functioning financial markets and venture capital-friendly regulation might 
prove to be a more effective and efficient way of stimulating innovation than the public funding 
of SMEs. Governments are unlikely to be as capable in selecting and monitoring promising 
start-ups as business angels and venture capitalists are (see box Heterogeneity in capital 
markets for start-up companies). In contrast to direct public funding of SMEs, indirect policies 
offer a better ground for European coordination. For example, harmonised and transparent 
regulation of Europe’s capital markets could contribute to a common European capital market. 
An increase in the scale of the capital market stimulates innovation as it induces trade in a 
greater variety of financial products and makes private funds available to business angels, 
venture capitalist and SMEs. 
 
Another possible source of scale economies is European harmonisation of regulation affecting 
SMEs. If SMEs do not have to invest in learning laws and rules for every new country they 
want to do business in, it becomes much more attractive for them to export, invest abroad and to 
cooperate on innovation with foreign firms (Kox and Lejour (2005)). Harmonisation is 
especially important for SMEs as the administrative burden of doing business in several 
countries is small for large firms compared to their revenues.  
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6.2  Externalities 
Apparently economies of scale do not exist in government financing of SMEs. As a 
consequence coordinating SMEs policies at the EU level will also not internalise possible 
externalities from national policies. This section tests this hypothesis further. In theory 
governments might be discouraged in supporting their SMEs if they see part of the benefits 
‘leak’ abroad. This can occur if the knowledge generated by an SME receiving public funding 
spills over to other countries, or if part of the buyer surplus attributable to an SMEs innovation 
is enjoyed by foreign consumers. The policy externalities induced by knowledge spillovers and 
foreign buyer surpluses have already been discussed in Chapter 2 and these are not of a 
different nature when the firms under consideration are SMEs, except for the fact that SMEs are 
on average more domestically oriented.
27 This implies that policy externalities are likely to be 
weaker and thus that European coordination will be less useful.  
 
CIS3 provides information on whether innovative SMEs cooperate with foreign firms when 
they are innovating. Figure 6.2 plots the proportion of SMEs that cooperate with foreign firms 
located in the EU or EFTA
28 against the proportion of SMEs that received public funding.  
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Source: CIS3 (Eurostat); a list of country codes is provided in Annex A Italy has been omitted from regression. 
 
27 The size of SMEs varies enormously. It includes self-employed but also important exporting firms up to 250 employees. 
For the latter type of firms the international externalities are much more important on average than for the small firms. 
28 Again the proportion was computed as the number of respondents answering “yes” divided by the number of respondents 
answering either “yes” or “no”.  
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A positive, but statistically insignificant relation appears to be present between public funding 
and international cooperation. Countries in which SMEs are more likely to receive public 
funding – like the Netherlands – also tend to have SMEs that are more inclined to cooperate 
with firms in other EU or EFTA countries. Apparently, international knowledge spillovers do 
not seem to discourage public support for SMEs, which implies that those spillovers do no lead 
to a policy externality. 
 
Next to knowledge spillovers, also the surplus enjoyed by foreign users might give rise to a 
policy externality. As an approximation for the share of user surplus leaking abroad, we have 
taken the average share of exports in total turnover for innovative SMEs, which is also available 
from CIS3. The results are visualised in Figure 6.3. No relation between public funding and 
exports is discernable in this figure. Rather surprising is that exports do not seem to be 
important for SMEs in the Netherlands, even though they tend to cooperate with foreign firms a 
lot while this is the other way around for Italy.
29 
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Source: CIS3 (Eurostat); a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
 
6.3  Heterogeneity 
The absence of scale effects regarding innovation policy aimed at SMEs, could be due to 
different roles played by SMEs in different economies. For example, SMEs could differ from 
 
29 The outcome might be affected by the sample of firms represented in CIS 3, which is biased towards innovative SMEs. 
National statistical agencies, however, correct for this bias when reporting aggregate data.  
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one country to another with respect to the sources for innovation available to them. Figure 6.4 
displays the relative importance of nine different sources based upon the number of respondents 
citing a source as being highly used. The bars are ranked according to the proportion of SMEs 
reporting public funding, such that in Denmark public funding is least reported while in Italy 
public funding is most widespread. Judging from the figure, the differences between countries 
do not seem to be that large. The most important sources for innovation are within the 
enterprise, from suppliers, customers and in some counties fairs and exhibitions. The own 
industry and enterprise group, universities and the government are less important as source for 
innovation by SMEs. In particular, the size of public funding appears to be unrelated with the 
relative importance of innovation sources. 

















































within enterprise within enterprise group suppliers
customers own industry universities
government, non-profit conferences, journals fairs, exhibitions  
Source: CIS3 (Eurostat); a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
 
Nevertheless, heterogeneity between countries is substantial according to other indicators. 
Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3 reveal substantial variation in the degree of international orientation 
of SMEs across countries. Only 19% of the Spanish innovative SMEs cooperate with foreign 
firms compared with almost 37% of the Belgian SMEs – not to mention the 2% of Italian 
SMEs.
30 A similar variation is present when looking at the share of exports in turnover (Figure 
6.3). 
 
30 Of course, part of this variation can be explained by differences in the size of economies as firms in a large country are 
more likely to find a domestic partner than firms in a small country even if both have the same bias against foreign firms.  
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Heterogeneity in capital markets for start-up companies 
Starting an innovative new firm brings along a great amount of uncertainty. Besides the risks faced by any start-up, a 
new  innovating  firm  also  is  confronted  with  uncertainty  about  the  demand  for  its  products  and  the  reliability  and 
efficiency of its production process. When searching for investors, asymmetric information is therefore a greater problem 
for this category of firms than it is for SMEs in general. Venture capitalists have responded to this imperfection in the 
capital  market  by  devoting  greater  resources  to  understanding  and  monitoring  than  other  investors  tend  to  do.  In 
addition, governments have come up with various policies to support innovative start-ups. The importance of these two 
sources of finance for innovators varies in Europe.  
 
The figure below plots the proportion of innovative start-ups who reported the use of public funds against the percentage 
of venture capital in GDP. The figure shows that between a third (Italy) and a sixth (Sweden) of the innovative start-ups 
used public funds. The difference between countries regarding the supply of venture capital is even larger: Sweden has 
five times as much venture capital as Austria – relative to GDP. The figure also vaguely suggests that countries in which 
entrepreneurs have greater access to venture capital are less likely to use public funding. This could reflect the efforts of 
governments to alleviate failure of capital markets, or it could point at public funding crowding out private venture capital. 
 
These findings are consistent with a study by Wallsten (2000) on the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) in the 
USA. Wallsten finds that SBIR funding crowds out private R&D funding ‘dollar for dollar’. Other authors are more arrive 
at more optimistic conclusions on SBIR. Lerner (1999), for example, shows that companies winning a SBIR grant tend 
to grow faster and attract more private venture capital than other companies, presumably because an SBIR grant is 
seen as a certification of quality. SBIR was also favourably judged in special issue of Small Business Economics, 20(2), 
dedicated to policies promoting innovation by SMEs in the USA and UK (Siegel et al. (2003)). 
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Source: CIS3, Eurostat; a list of country codes is provided in Annex A 
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6.4  Subsidiarity in SME and venture capital policy 
There is a large variety of innovation policies targeted at SMEs. We do not deal with all these 
policies in particular because many of them are country specific. In stead, we have focussed on 
the question of subsidiarity regarding the public funding of innovative SMEs. Based on CIS3 
survey results we have concluded that economies of scale are unlikely to be present in public 
funding of innovative SMEs. In addition, we have not found any evidence indicating the 
existence of policy externalities due to knowledge spillovers or foreign buyer surpluses. 
Although these externalities could play a role for the larger middle-sized, export-oriented firms, 
the evidence did not show up for the average SME. Heterogeneity in innovation sources is 
rather limited for European SMEs, but the degree of external orientation differs substantially 
from one country to another. We conclude that there is no role of Europe in coordinating 
innovation policies from the subsidiarity principle, however European coordination can enhance 
innovation by SMEs by reducing or unifying regulation and by facilitating the development of a 
common financial market, such that doing business abroad becomes cheaper and the supply of 
venture capital increases. 
Successful innovation policy in the Netherlands 
Cornet  et  al.  (2006a)  have  identified  several  types  of  innovation  policies  which  are  potentially  successful  in  the 
Netherlands. The first of them is aimed at small- and medium sized enterprises, namely the expansion of the provisions 
for  starting  innovating  companies  within  the  so-called  Law  Promoting  Research  and  Development  (in  Dutch:  Wet 
Bevordering Speur- en Ontwikkelingswerk, WBSO). These provisions allow innovative SMEs a deduction in wage taxes 
and premiums for R&D employees. In current chapter we conclude that there are no economies of scale in public 
funding of innovative SMEs. In addition we do not find any evidence indicating the existence of policy externalities due 
to knowledge spillovers or foreign buyer surpluses. There are therefore no reasons to lift the WBSO to the European 
scale. On the other hand, the concept of WBSO is applied in many countries (see surveys by Hall and Van Reenen 
(2000) and Cornet (2001)) – whether or not these subsidies should be intensified in other Member States falls outside 
the scope of Cornet et al. (2006a) and the current paper. 
 
A second potentially successful policy is expansion of public support for funds that supply small amounts of venture 
capital loans. Two important components of such a policy are that private investors decide whether a company receives 
a loan and that these private investors share in the risk (Boot and Schmeits (2004)). As with the first policy, the national 
level seems appropriate for this kind of policy. Again, the concept of public-private cooperation in the provision of 
venture capital loans is not specific for the Dutch economy and can likely be successfully applied by other Member 
States. 
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7  Intellectual property rights and standards  
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) not only provide firms with an incentive to innovate, but they 
also play an important role in the diffusion of knowledge and the development of standards. 
In this section, we first discuss subsidiarity issues pertaining to patent systems. Second, we 
describe the role of Standard Setting Organisations (SSOs) in the EU. We conclude with an 
assessment of the roles played by IPRs and standardisation in Europe’s competition policy. 
7.1  Patents 
When it comes to technological innovation, intellectual property rights are usually awarded 
through patent systems.
31 A patent system can contribute to innovation in two ways. First, it 
increases the rewards to research by granting a temporary exclusive right to use the invention. 
Second, it stimulates the diffusion of knowledge as patents contain a complete and publicly 
accessible description of an invention. Not only does a patent system reduce duplicate research 
efforts in this way, it also provides inspiration for new inventions. 
Both of these functions can be performed better if the scale of the patent system increases. 
Scale matters for R&D-incentives as a patent enjoying protection in all Member States of the 
EU is worth more than a patent valid in only one Member State. The diffusion of technology is 
also stimulated by the size of the jurisdiction of a patent system. A patent system spanning 
several countries systematically cross-references between patents granted in different countries, 
whereas this does not apply to patent systems restricted to single countries.
32 From an 
administrative point of view a larger scale also might have drawbacks as each patent application 
has to be compared with a larger number of granted patents. In practise, of course, an increase 
in scale will most likely lead to a more narrow and specialised search among earlier patents, 
thus keeping administrative cost within bounds. 
 
Despite the obvious advantages of scale, the European Union still does not have a single 
patenting system, a system usually referred to as the “Community Patent” (see box Applying for 
a patent in Europe). There are probably four major reasons why such a Community Patent has 
not been established to date. First, a Community Patent will expand the average geographical 
coverage of a patent, thereby promoting the diffusion of knowledge via patent citations while 
simultaneously discouraging outright imitation of foreign inventions. Both consequences can 
trigger protectionist behaviour by national governments. A country with a strong knowledge 
base might fear an increase in knowledge spillovers abroad, while a country in which foreign 
inventions are being imitated on a large scale is not eager to see improvements in the IPRs of 
 
31 For software, copyright protection is also relevant. 
32 Officially, European patent clerks have search all patent databases in the world in order to establish newness. In practice, 
this is a time-consuming task – in particular because patents have to be translated.  
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foreign companies. Both elements give rise to a policy externality. If a country makes it easier 
for foreign firms to patent their inventions, for example by reducing translation requirements, 
this has a positive effect on the competitiveness of foreign firms vis-à-vis domestic firms. As a 
result individual governments will not open up their patent systems. A Community Patent 
internalises most of this policy externality as all Member States simultaneously reduce their 
barriers to foreign firms. A problem arises when the net benefit of cooperation is negative for 
some countries. In that case, agreement over the establishment of a Community Patent can be 
frustrated by a minority of Member States.  
Second, there is the problem of language. The cost of translating a patent are substantial – 
especially when (a part of) each patent should be translated in all languages of the European 
Union. Only allowing patent applications in English, German or French reduces translation 
cost, but at the same time would introduce barriers for countries in which one of these 
languages is not widely spoken or understood. 
Third, the Community Patent seems to be affected by a conflict of interest between SMEs 
and large companies. SMEs are in favour of a Community Patent if it would reduce the cost of 
filing and litigation. In particular, SMEs tend to be in favour of an English-only system.
33 
Larger companies tend oppose the formation of a European Patent Court because they are 
concerned that such a new court will have insufficient experience in handling litigation 
procedures (European Commission (2006c)).
34 These positions confirm the view that large 
companies benefit from maintaining the status quo, which, coincidentally, imposes barriers to 
multi-country patenting – especially for SMEs. 
Fourth a Community Patent is not in the interest of some of the patent offices and, 
especially, patent courts of individual Member States, because of a likely loss in employment. 
As cooperation of national offices is important for the establishment of a Community Patent, 
this hurdle is a difficult one to overcome. 
 
In the last thirty years, various attempts to establish a Community Patent have been undertaken 
– all unsuccessful. The most recent attempt of establishing a Community Patent was titled the 
Community Patent Regulation (CPR). The CPR should have provided a single patent system for 
the EU with one court holding exclusive jurisdiction to invalidate patents. After an initial 
political agreement, the CPR was finally rejected in March 2004 because of failure to agree on 
the time delays for translation of the patent. The former Commissioner for the Common Market 
Frits Bolkestein commented on this rejection as follows: 
 
33 Italian and Portuguese SMEs are in favour of a multilingual system, instead.  
34 The position of large companies may vary across countries.  
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“ I can only hope that one day the vested, protectionist interests that stand in the way of 
agreement on this vital measure will be sidelined by the over-riding importance and interests of 
European manufacturing industry and Europe's competitiveness. That day has not yet come.” 
(European Commission (2004a)) 
 
From the viewpoint of subsidiarity, the Community Patent would be desirable because scale 
economies due to both a better protection of IPRs and wider diffusion of knowledge. A 
Community Patent internalises the incentive of national governments to keep their patent 
systems relatively unattractive to foreign firms. Heterogeneity in languages provides a powerful 
political argument against the Community Patent – although this argument apparently is not 
supported by SMEs in most Member States. A more likely explanation for the absence of a 
Community Patent is protectionism by Member States. 
Applying for a patent in Europe 
When applying for a patent in Europe the applicant can follow three routes. First, the applicant can apply at the national 
patent offices of the countries for which protection of an invention is desired. Second, he or she can apply for a so-called 
“European Patent” at the European Patent Office (EPO). When the application is made, the applicant must state in 
advance for which European countries the patent should apply. Protection can be requested only for the 28 countries 
that  have  signed  the  European  Patent  Convention  (EPC).  Once  the  patent  has  been  granted  by  the  EPO,  the 
applicant’s invention is protected in the chosen countries exactly as if patents had been granted by the national patent 
offices of those countries. A European Patent has to be submitted in English, German or French. For the patent to be 
enforceable it must have been translated in an official language of the contracting state for which protection is being 
sought. 
 
A third route to a patent is through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (Khan and Dernis (2005, Annex A)). The PCT 
currently has 131 contracting states. A PCT application has two phases. In the first phase a “receiving” patent office – 
which is the EPO for several European countries amongst which The Netherlands – conducts an international search 
and  (optionally)  performs  a  preliminary  evaluation  of  the  patent  application.  In  the  second  phase,  the  application 
together with the findings of the receiving office is transferred to the national patent offices, which then decide whether 
or not to grant a patent for their jurisdiction. 
 
The drawback of the European Patent is that once a patent is granted, it effectively becomes a collection of national 
patents. As a result any litigation can only take place at the national level, raising the cost of a defence against patent 
infringement spanning multiple countries. In addition, the protection of a European Patent varies according to national 
patent laws. Since the 1970s there have been attempts to establish a patent system that is truly European, commonly 
referred to as the “Community Patent” (European Commission (2006b), Wikipedia (2006)). The 1975 Convention for the 
European Patent for the Common Market (CPC) should have led to a Community Patent but was not ratified by all of the 
nine signing countries. Several unsuccessful attempts to revive the Community Patent have followed, the most recent 
being the Community Patent Regulation (CPR). 
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7.2  Standards 
Three types of market failures related to standardisation have been discussed in Section 2.1.4. 
Markets may tolerate to a lock-in into inferior standards set by dominant firms, a lack of 
standardisation or excessive standardisation. Governments generally leave the development of 
standards to SSOs, which are better suited to prevent inferior standards and to promote 
standardisation. 
 
Reference to SSO standards in laws and regulation is common, but usually is confined to areas 
related to safety, health and environment. In these areas, standardisation has predominantly 
been elevated to the European level with the adoption of the New Approach to product 
regulation, which started in 1987 (European Commission (2000)). As a consequence, non-tariff 
barriers to trade within the EU have been reduced significantly. Under the New Approach, the 
European Commission can instruct one of the three European Standards Organisations (ESOs, 
see box below) to develop standards that are consistent with a regulation.
35  Most of the 
activities of ESOs are performed directly for private parties. The scale advantages of 
standardisation are widely recognised by the ESOs and they actively work together with 
international standards bodies like the IEEE, ITU and ISO.
36 
Standards commissioned by the EC are not mandatory, but once a firm complies with these 
standards it automatically complies with European regulation. Firms wishing not to adhere to 
applicable standards need to prove that they are complying with European regulation before 
they are allowed to sell their products. Needless to say, this can be much more costly than 
adapting to standards recognised by the EC. The involvement of the EC or national 
governments in standard-setting outside the domain of safety, health or environment is rather 
limited. 
Not all standardisation takes place at the European level. National SSOs like the “Nederlands 
Normalisatie-instituut” (NEN) are still actively developing standards. As the value of a standard 
crucially depends on the scale on which it is used, a European standard generally is to be 
preferred over a national standard. Blum (2005), for example, argues that all national standards 
bodies should merge into the ESOs for this reason.  
This kind of scale economy is due to network effects stemming from interoperability rather 
than the presence of fixed cost or the internalisation of policy externalities. Although the fixed 
cost of developing a standard can be substantial, there would be no reason for making these 
costs if network effects are absent as in that case the standard would be worthless. The 
internalisation of policy externalities also is not likely to be the primary source of scale 
 
35 Besides the EU, also members of EFTA delegate the development of standards to these institutes. 
36 The abbreviations stand for: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU), and International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO).  
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economies in standardisation policy. In principle, a country could free-ride on standards 
developed in other countries. Considering that SSOs mostly work on a commercial basis, such a 
policy externality is unlikely to cause major problems. 
An argument against ESOs would be that they prevent competition between standards. This 
argument is not very plausible as competition between standards on a European or global 
market is very well possible
37 and is better than ‘competition’ between national standards, as in 
the latter case country size will be decisive in stead of the quality of the standard. A more 
plausible argument in favour of the continued existence of national SSOs alongside the ESOs is 
that national organisations can better respond to the specific needs of national governments and 
firms. In addition the ESOs provide a platform for coordination between national standards 
bodies. 
 
The ESOs are not subject to the political controversy that has surrounded the Community 
Patent. Having reached a high degree of institutional integration, the current priorities of the EC 
are “more extensive use of European standardisation in European policies and legislation”, 
raising the efficiency of the ESOs and promoting the involvement of SMEs in European 
standards (European Commission (2006a)). 
The three European Standards Organisations 
The  three  ESOs  are  the  European  Telecommunications  Standards  Institute  (ETSI),  the  European  Committee  for 
Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC). The activities of 
ETSI are confined to telecommunications. ETSI is responsible for standards like GSM, ADSL and DECT (portable fixed-
line  phones).  CENELEC  is  concerned  with  the  standardisation  of  electro  technical  equipment.  CENELEC  has 
contributed standards for electromagnetic compatibility, the accuracy of medical devices and digital television. CEN 
develops  standards  for  areas  not  covered  by  ETSI  or  CENELEC,  as  diverse  ranging  from  building  materials  to 
condoms. The ESOs have developed rather independently from the EU and are already several decades old: CEN was 
established in 1961, CENELEC in 1973 and ETSI in 1988. 
 
7.3  Competition policy 
Competition in innovative industries is far more complex than in less innovative, more 
traditional, industries. One reason for this complexity is that an innovation often requires the 
intellectual property of several firms. This implies that firms have to cooperate in order to be 
innovative. Such cooperation can take several forms: firms may cross-license patents, they 
might contribute them to a patent pool
38 or they can make them available for use in standards 
against Reasonable and Non Discriminatory Licensing (RAND) terms. However, cooperation 
between firms can also reduce competition and thus may be harmful as it raises prices (Encaoua 
 
37 The IEEE, for example, supports various competing standards on wireless communication protocols and DVDs. 
38 A patent pool is a collection of (complementary) patents that can be licensed collectively.  
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and Hollander (2002)). Competition authorities face the difficult task of deciding whether the 
benefits of cooperation (new or better products) outweigh the cost (a higher price). 
The complementarity of intellectual property belonging to different firms also can lead to 
anti-competitive behaviour if one firm refuses to license a patent or disclose information to 
another firm. Competition authorities here face the trade-off as well. If licensing against RAND 
terms is made obligatory then this reduces the reward for innovation for the licensing firm. If a 
refusal to license is tolerated then innovation by the would-be licensee is hampered. The same 
dilemma applies to the disclosure of business secrets like the source code of software 
programmes. 
 
Anti-competitive behaviour in innovative industries is not always easy to identify by 
competition authorities. In order to create a ‘safe harbour’ for firms desiring to cooperate on 
innovation, the EC has granted a ‘block-exemption’ for the transfer of technology between two 
companies. This means that licensing agreements for patents, software and other IPRs are 
automatically considered not to be anti-competitive – provided that certain conditions have been 
met (European Commission (2004b)). The block-exemption for technology transfer does not 
apply to the development of standards because they usually involve more than two parties. For 
this reason, ETSI actively seeks to prevent anti-competitive behaviour of its members through 
education and screening of agreements (ETSI (2001)). 
 
Major R&D efforts by private companies are rarely a domestic affair. Often several 
multinational companies cooperate in order to develop a new product or create a global 
technical standard. National authorities – with the exception of the US Federal Trade 
Commission – have very limited powers when multinational companies engage in anti-
competitive innovative actions. A joint European competition policy is therefore necessary in 
order to prevent anti-competitive outcomes of R&D collaboration on a European scale. 
Fortunately, coordination of competition policy in the EU is in a rather advanced state. National 
regulatory authorities work in accordance with EC regulation for local cases, they cooperate on 
multinational cases and exchange information in the European Competition Network (ECN) 
and the most severe and complex cases – e.g. the case concerning the Microsoft Windows 
operating system – are being handled by the EC’s Directorate General for Competition.  
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7.4  Subsidiarity in IPR and standardisation policy 
The benefits of European coordination are clear when it comes to the protection of intellectual 
property rights (IPRs), the promotion of standardisation and the prevention of anti-competitive 
behaviour in innovative activities. Nevertheless, experiences are mixed when it comes to the 
degree of European coordination that has been achieved so far. European coordination is 
currently insufficient when it comes to the protection of IPRs. The application procedure at the 
European Patent Office (EPO) is fully centralised, but once a patent has been granted it falls 
under national legislation. As a consequence, the patent should be translated into an official 
language for each country the patent is to be registered with. In addition, litigation procedures 
are country specific. Both elements make acquiring and defending patents an expensive affair – 
especially for SMEs. Political arguments against the establishment of a Community Patent are 
based on the heterogeneity of languages in the EU. However, a policy externality in the form of 
protectionism seems to be the underlying factor here. 
European coordination is at a more advanced stage for standardisation and competition 
policy than it is for IPR policy. Both standardisation and competition policy take place at three 
levels: national, multinational and European. The European Standards Organisations develop 
voluntary European standards in coordination with international standards organisations. In 
addition they provide a platform for multilateral cooperation between national standards bodies. 
Scale economies in standardisation stem from network effects rather than the internalisation of 
policy externalities.  
A similar institutional structure can be found for competition policy. The European 
Commission deals with anti-competitive behaviour occurring on a (supra-) European scale, 
while national competition authorities coordinate for multinational cases via the European 
Competition Network. Maintaining these three levels of policy has the advantage being able to 
exploit scale economies where possible while preserving the flexibility needed to cope with 
national idiosyncrasies.  
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8  European Framework Programmes 
8.1  Seventh Framework Programme (FP7) 
8.1.1  Description 
The Seventh Framework Programme
39 (FP7) is an initiative of DG Research under which 
various subsidies are granted for both public and private research. The proposed budget of FP7 
currently is 53.3 billion euros for the period 2007-2013. This amounts to an average yearly 
budget of 7.6 billion euros, which is substantial when compared to the 65 billion euros spent on 
public research by the Member States of the EU in 2003. FP7 consists of four programmes: 
•  Cooperation (32.4 billion) 
•  Ideas (7.5 billion) 
•  People (4.7 billion) 
•  Capacities (4.2 billion) 
 
Besides these four programmes and the budget of EURATOM, FP7 also has a budget for the 
Joint Research Centre (JRC) amounting to 1.8 billion euros and a budget for research on nuclear 
energy (EURATOM) of 2.8 billion euros. 
 
Cooperation. The programme Cooperation receives the bulk of the FP7 budget. The objective 
of this programme is “supporting the whole range of research actions carried out in trans-
national cooperation” (European Commission (2006d, p. 175)). The programme covers 
collaborative research in ten thematic areas.
40 All kinds of transnational consortia – public, 
private and public-private – can apply for subsidies for research activities. Support for 
transnational cooperation will be implemented through Collaborative Research, Joint 
Technology Initiatives, Coordination of non-community (national and inter-governmental) 
Research Programmes and international cooperation. 
Collaborative Research provides funding for transnational collaboration and has the bulk of 
the programme’s budget. Proposals for projects under the sub-programme Collaborative 
Research must be made by at least three legal entities, no two of which are established in the 
same Member State. In this manner an incentive is offered for transnational cooperation. In the 
previous framework programme (FP6), the participation of the private sector was rather limited 
(SER (2004)). The European Technology Platforms (ETPs) should give the private sector more 
influence on the priorities of FP7. These ETPs consist of business-leaders who are going to 
 
39 FP7 actually consists of two framework programmes: the “Seventh Framework Programme of the European Community 
for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration Activities” and the “Seventh Framework Programme of the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) for Nuclear Research and Training Activities”. 
40 The exact number and description of the themes is still being debated at the publication time of this report.  
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formulate Strategic Research Agenda’s that should give a direction to the allocation of funds. If 
an ETP is deemed to be of strategic importance for the EU, it can be turned into a Joint 
Technology Initiative. Joint Technology Initiatives provide funding for long-term public-private 
research projects based on the Strategic Research Agenda’s. Coordination of National Research 
Programmes offers possibilities for multilateral cooperation and joint implementation of public 
policies. 
 
Ideas. The programme Ideas establishes a European Research Council (ERC). The ERC should 
fund projects proposed by researchers, similar to the National Science Foundation of the US 
(and the Dutch NWO). Formally, the objective of this programme is “supporting ‘investigator-
driven’ research carried out across all fields by individual national or transnational teams in 
competition at the European level”. Only one legal entity is required for funding. 
 
People. The programme People is meant to financially support individual researchers in the EU. 
The Marie Curie Fellowships are an example of what is covered by the programme. The 
objectives are to improve both the quantity and quality of researchers and to make researchers 
more mobile in the EU. 
 
Capacities. The programme Capacities comprises a list of things that are to be supported: 
research infrastructures, research potential of regions, research for SMEs, Science in Society, 
“support to the coherent development of policies” and “horizontal activities of international 
cooperation”. The emphasis seems to lie on support for research infrastructures and SMEs. 
8.1.2  The EC’s perspective on the subsidiarity of FP7 
Legally, the Treaty of Amsterdam recognises a role for an EU policy on research and 
technological development (RTD) in articles 163 to 173. It further defines Framework 
Programme’s as the primary instrument for such a policy. However, official documents by the 
EC offer few answers to the question why FP7 would be preferable to separate national 
innovation policies. An exception is the commission staff working paper provided as an annex 
to the FP7 proposal (European Commission (2005b, Annex p. 21)). Specifically, the document 
cites three types of arguments for EU intervention. 
•  Pooling and leveraging of resources 
•  Fostering human capacity and excellence in S&T through training, mobility, career 
development and competition at European level 
•  Better integration of European R&D policies 
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Pooling and leveraging of resources. This type argument refers to scale economies in research 
projects as a reason for EU involvement. A distinction is made between achieving “critical 
mass”, leveraging private investment and enabling “big science”. It not made very clear what a 
critical mass should entail, but it can be achieved by multinational and interdisciplinary 
collaboration. Probably, what is hinted at here is that EU-funded research projects contribute to 
integration of European R&D, which results in scale economies through the formation of a 
larger knowledge base. This type of argument has been discussed in Section 2.2.2. EU-support 
for private R&D has the advantage that it allows cooperation of firms from different countries. 
National governments will not support a group of firms collaborating on research if one of those 
firms is foreign as part of the benefits will leak abroad. EU-coordination can resolve this 
prisoner’s dilemma for collaboration between European firms as the benefits of EU support 
remain within the EU, see Section 3.2 for a detailed discussion of issues like this one. The big 
science argument refers to research projects with high fixed cost. Some research projects are too 
expensive and complex to be managed by a single country. At the European scale, however, 
such large projects can be more feasible (see Section 2.1.6). 
 
Fostering human capacity and excellence. Four arguments are put forward under this heading: 
facilitating mobility of researchers, making Europe more attractive for researchers, promoting 
knowledge diffusion and enabling pan-European competition for funding of public research. 
Mobility of researchers clearly is an aspect of an integrated European research area and as such 
is within the domain of EU-policy. Whether European grants are an effective instrument for 
making Europe a more attractive place for researchers, is debatable as these grants do not 
change the functioning of universities and research institutes. The last two arguments, that FP7 
promotes knowledge diffusion and competition among researchers, also refer to the economies 
of scale in research. A better diffusion of knowledge makes it easier for researchers to prevent 
duplication and provides incentives to researchers to specialise themselves. This argument has 
been discussed in Sections 2.1.6 and 2.2.2. 
 
Better integration of European R&D policies. Two points are made here. First, pan-European 
challenges to public policy can better addressed by a single European policy. This argument 
refers both to free-rider problems caused by policy externalities and to scale economies in 
public administration. Cooperating on R&D policies can prevent that some countries are ‘free-
riding’ on R&D expenditures of other countries. Centralisation of R&D policies can improve 
the selection procedures for R&D projects, reducing cost and preventing duplication. A more 
detailed discussion can be found in Chapter 3. A second argument is that coordination of 
national policies reduces overlap and isolation of national public research and promotes 
diffusion of research results. This argument implicitly refers to scale economies in research, as 
was the case for “Fostering human capacity and excellence”. Scale economies in research have 
been covered more extensively in Sections 2.1.6 and 2.2.2.  
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Summarising, the working document emphasises that FP7 should promote economies of scale 
in both public and private research. Less often mentioned as a rationale for EU-coordination are 
policy externalities and scale economies in public administration. No opinion is given on what 
aspects of innovation policy should remain a national responsibility. 
8.1.3  The subsidiarity principle applied to FP7 
The largest part of FP7 can be classified as centralised policy. Only one instrument of the 
programme Cooperation is concerned with multilateral cooperation on innovation policies. FP7 
is confined to allocating funds to public and private research. As such, it covers only some of 
the aspects of innovation policy. The following of the policy instruments treated in Chapters 4 
through 7 are being used in FP7: public investment in R&D, public funding of private R&D 
(including public-private collaboration) and SMEs and venture capital. The theoretical 
arguments for policy centralisation of public research are economies of scale in research and in 
public administration. In FP7 these arguments are reflected in the objectives of the majority of 
its programmes. The programmes Cooperation and People should foster the diffusion of 
knowledge within Europe, while the programme Ideas can benefit from economies of scale in 
public administration by avoiding duplication and by a more efficient allocation of funds. 
The explorative empirical analysis of Chapter 4 has shown that the proportion of public 
R&D in total government expenditure depends positively on GDP. The economies of scale are 
probably mainly caused by the internalisation of policy externalities. Countries in which a high 
proportion of domestic patents is owned by foreign companies spend less on public R&D than 
countries in which this kind of ‘leakage’ is limited. Together, the theoretical and empirical 
analysis provide sufficient ground for European coordination of public research. 
The second instrument available in FP7 is public funding of private R&D. Our empirical 
analysis has shown that economies of scale are likely to occur, but that these scale effects are 
probably not due to the internalisation of policy externalities. The main purpose of this 
instrument is to promote economic integration in innovative sectors, such that economies of 
scale in research can be exploited. 
The programme Capacities is aimed at research infrastructures, SMEs and backward 
regions. Neither the theoretical nor the empirical analysis provide any support for European 
coordination of this programme. No scale economies are present and there also are no policy 
externalities involved. Therefore, support specifically targeted at SMEs does not seem justified 
from the perspective of subsidiarity – with the exception of support that is intended to reduce 
the barriers faced by SMEs when trying to participate in FP7. 
 
Summarising, the Seventh Framework Programme is largely consistent with the principle of 
subsidiarity for most of its programmes. The programme Capacities forms the only exception: 
the activities of this programme predominantly belong to the domain of national policy.  
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Universities: higher education and innovation 
A large share of the FP budget is allocated to research proposals by universities. For universities framework 
programmes are important to fund research. The requested international cooperation by FP increases the international 
orientation of universities. Besides the job market for universities is becoming more and more international, and 
international student mobility increases. From these developments one could mistakenly conclude that universities 
should be completely financed by Europe instead of national governments. Ederveen and Thissen (2006) address the 
question whether there are arguments to shift higher education policies from the national to the European level. Using 
subsidiarity as guiding principle in their analysis (as is done in this document) they find little support for European 
coordination of higher education. First, they find no support for economies of scale, i.e. larger countries do not 
necessarily provide higher quality education; nor do larger schools. Second, empirical evidence for human capital 
externalities through student mobility is scarce. However, there is evidence that student mobility is a precursor for labour 
migration. A uniform structure of higher education in the EU, and making educational programs more transparent, may 
therefore be defended from this perspective. Quality does matter for students, and student mobility is increasing. This 
may be beneficial to labour mobility. 
 
8.2  Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP)
41 
8.2.1  Description 
The Competitiveness and Innovation framework Programme (CIP) is an initiative of DG 
Enterprise and Industry. The proposed budget is 3.6 billion euros for the period 2007-2013 (or 
0.5 billion euros annually), which is less then 10% of the budget for FP7. The CIP consists of 
three specific programs: 
•  The Entrepreneurship and Innovation programme (3/5 of the budget) 
•  The ICT policy support programme (1/5 of the budget) 
•  The Intelligent Energy − Europe Programme (1/5 of the budget) 
 
The Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme will bring together activities on 
entrepreneurship, small and medium-sized enterprises, industrial competitiveness and 
innovation. It encompasses the promotion of public-private innovation partnerships for SMEs, 
the provision of community financial instruments to overcome the poor access to equity, 
venture capital and loans for SMEs and the exchange of good practice between national and 
regional authorities.  
The ICT policy support programme will stimulate the wider uptake of ICT by citizens, 
businesses and governments and aim at intensifying the public investment in ICT. The role of 
the EC is to enable the development of common approaches and coordinated actions, the 
 
41 Based on European Commission, 2005, Proposal for a DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL establishing a Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (2007-2013), Communication 121 final.  
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sharing of good practices and the deployment of interoperable solutions across the Union − all 
in support of the private sector and the Member States, which are the key actors in the 
deployment and best use of ICT. 
The objective of the Intelligent Energy − Europe Programme is to support sustainable 
development as it relates to energy and to contribute to the achievement of the general goals of 
environmental protection, security of supply and competitiveness. It is a non-technological 
programme in the field of energy focusing on the removal of non-technical barriers, the creation 
of market opportunities and raising awareness. 
8.2.2  The EC’s perspective on the subsidiarity of CIP 
The EC stresses the potential for Member States to learn from each other in their innovation 
policies regarding SMEs. The EC recognises the fragmentation along national and regional 
lines, which hinder Member States in drawing on the creative potential in other EU countries. 
The EC also points at the deficient provision of national policies regarding failures in financial 
markets and intents to stimulate the diffusion of good practice across Member States.  
The second motivation to involve in innovation policies for SMEs is to foster business 
cooperation throughout the EU. The access for firms to innovation policy will be easier if all 
Member States adopt a common support structure.  
In both cases, the EC recognises the key role for national and even regional policy. The aim 
of the CIP is mainly to support these national innovation policies and allow Member States to 
learn from each other. 
8.2.3  The subsidiarity principle applied to CIP 
The CIP is aimed at SMEs, some of them might operate internationally (via FDI or trade), but 
many of them are local firms operating for the local market. Rightly, the EC recognises the 
prime responsibility of Member States in innovation policy regarding SMEs. 
The diversity in SME policy between Member States justifies the attempt to learn from each 
other. Given the large diversity in national innovation policies towards SMEs, the potential to 
learn is large. Learning is, however, hampered by the fact that not only policy diverges, but also 
the SMEs themselves are quite heterogeneous. This limits the possibility for one Member State 
to successfully apply the innovation policy of other countries. 
The arguments developed in Chapter 6 on SMEs, entrepreneurship and venture capital apply 
to the Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme and the ICT programme. Neither scale 
economies nor external effects seem to be important in both programmes and warrant EU 
intervention. European involvement is justified only insofar CIP meets the goals of reducing 
regulations for innovative SMEs and of promoting policy learning between Member States. 
A clear role for the EU is reserved for the Intelligent Energy − Europe Programme, which 
clearly deals with the European, not to say worldwide problem of greenhouse gas emissions.  
  69 
Stimulating SMEs to develop and adopt energy-efficient technologies contributes to this global 
problem.  
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Annex A: Country codes 
List of country codes (ISO Alpha 3 codification) 
AUT  Austria  HVR  Croatia 
AUS  Australia  IRL  Ireland 
BEL  Belgium  ISL  Iceland 
BGR  Bulgaria  ITA  Italy 
CAN  Canada  JPN  Japan 
CHE  Switzerland  LIE  Liechtenstein 
CYP  Cyprus  LTU  Lithuania 
CZE  Czech Republic  LUX  Luxembourg 
DEU  Germany  LVA  Latvia 
DNK  Denmark  MLT  Malta 
ESP  Spain  NLD  Netherlands 
EST  Estonia  NOR  Norway 
EU  European Union  POL  Poland 
EU15  EU (15 countries)  PRT  Portugal 
EU25  EU (25 countries)  ROU  Romania 
FIN  Finland  SVK  Slovakia 
FRA  France  SVN  Slovenia 
GBR  United Kingdom  SWE  Sweden 
GRC  Greece  TUR  Turkey 
HUN  Hungary  USA  United States 
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